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vAbstract
In the first part of this dissertation we study the problem of designing desirable
mechanisms for economic environments with different types of informational and con-
sumption externalities. We first study the mechanism design problem for the class
of Bayesian environments where preferences of individuals depend not only on their
allocations but also on the welfare of other individuals. For these environments, we
fully characterize interim efficient mechanisms and examine their properties. This
set of mechanisms is compelling, since interim efficient mechanisms are the best in
the sense that there is no other mechanism which generates unanimous improvement.
For public good environments, we show that these mechanisms produce public goods
closer to the efficient level of production as the degree of altruism in the preferences
increases. For private good environments, we show that altruistic agents trade more
often than selfish agents.
We next consider a mechanism design problem for matching markets where exter-
nalities are present. We present mechanisms that implement the core correspondence
of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the
students have preferences regarding the other students who would attend the same
college. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is
vi
not guaranteed. We present a sequential mechanism implementing the core without
any restrictions on the preferences. We also show that simple two-stage mechanisms
cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium without strong assumptions on agents’ preferences.
In the final part of the dissertation we focus on another matching market, one-to-
one assignment games with money. We present an alternative way to characterize the
core as the fixed points of a certain mapping. We also introduce the first algorithm
that finds all core outcomes in assignment games. The lattice property of the stable
payoffs, as well as its non-emptiness, are proved using Tarski’s fixed point theorem.
We show that there is a polarization of interests in the core by using our formulation.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
2Mechanism design is a general way of thinking about institutions. An institution
or mechanism takes into it messages from agents and responds with an outcome. In
this framework, a group of individuals must choose an alternative from the set of pos-
sible alternatives and must decide how to arrange monetary transfers. Initially, each
agent obtains private information about each of the possible alternative outcomes.
An agent’s utility for a given alternative depends not only on her own material utility
but also on the welfare of other agents. This implies agents are unselfish or altruistic.
We first show how the existence of agents with this type of preference change the
mechanism design problem. Then, we propose the set of mechanisms that we can
observe in practice. These mechanisms correspond to the most efficient (or interim
efficient) mechanisms within the mechanisms that satisfy incentive and feasibility
constraints. If a mechanism is interim efficient, it can never be common knowledge
that there is another mechanism which makes some types of agents better off without
hurting other types of agents. This implies that any other mechanisms should not be
observed in practice. We also provide applications for both public and private goods
environments. In our applications, efficient decisions are independent of the social
concerns of the agents. However, we show that interim efficient decisions depend on
social concerns. In these mechanisms, inefficiencies in public good production de-
creases as the agents care more about the welfare of the other agents in the society.
For bilateral trade environments, we show that altruistic agents trade more often
than selfish agents. On the other hand, altruistic agents do not trade when it is not
optimal to trade.
3We next move to the sequential mechanism design problem for matching markets.
We introduce simple sequential mechanisms that implement the core correspondence
in college admissions problems when students do care about who else goes to the
same college. This is an important problem because it provides the noncooperative
foundations of the core and it might also help to design new institutions for the
real-life college admissions problem. In this matching market, there are two finite
disjoint sets of agents, the set of colleges and the set of students. Each college has a
preference relation over groups of students. Each student has a preferences relation
over colleges and groups of students (or classmates). A matching will be a particu-
lar assignment of students to colleges. The solution concept, core, specifies the set
of matchings we might observe in practice. In college admissions problems, it has
been shown that two-stage simple mechanisms, such as the “students propose and
colleges choose” mechanism and the “colleges propose and students choose” mech-
anism, implement the core. We show that only extension of the colleges propose
and students choose mechanism can implement the core under the restrictions that
guarantee the nonemptiness of the core. Therefore, the symmetry between these two
mechanisms does not hold when students also care about their classmates. We also
provide a multi-stage mechanism that implements the core without any restrictions
on the preferences. This chapter also shows that we should take into consideration
whether students care about their classmates or not when designing institutions for
the real-life matching problem.
We analyze another matching market, a one-to-one assignment game with money,
4in the final chapter. An assignment game is a two-sided matching market with mon-
etary transfers. In this market, there are two exogenously specified disjoint sets of
agents, say firms and workers. The agents engage in bilateral transactions (if worker
i works for firm j then firm j employs worker i) and make monetary transfers. Each
firm can employ no more than one worker and each worker can not work for more
than one firm. A natural solution concept for such markets is the core. The core
outcomes specify which partnership we can expect to observe and how the agents will
divide their gains. The assignment game has traditionally been studied in terms of
its linear programming formulations. We propose an alternative way to characterize
the core of assignment games as the fixed points of a certain mapping. Moreover, our
characterization gives an algorithm for finding the core outcomes. The characteri-
zation is useful because it allows us to construct a simple algorithm to find all core
outcomes and it provides a very simple proof for the lattice structure of the core and
for the polarization of interests in the core.
5Chapter 2
Behavioral Mechanism Design
62.1 Introduction
This paper studies the problem of designing mechanisms for the class of Bayesian en-
vironments with interdependent preferences. A group of individuals must choose an
alternative from the set of possible alternatives and must decide how to arrange mon-
etary transfers. Initially, each agent obtains private information about each possible
alternative. An agent’s utility for a given alternative depends not only on her own
material utility but also on the welfare of other agents. This implies agents are un-
selfish or altruistic. In this framework, we characterize the most efficient mechanisms
within the mechanisms that satisfy incentive and feasibility constraints.
The assumption of self interest is problematic. Self-interest hypothesis states that
preferences among allocations depend only on an agent’s own material well being.
Experimental results suggest that people often do care for well being of others and
have other preferences. For example, there is more contribution to public goods than
purely selfish maximization can lead us to expect. Moreover, people should not vote
in elections or contribute to public television if they are purely self interested. See
Ledyard (1995) for a survey on public goods which documents these and several other
anomalies. Similar anomalous results are also observed in private goods environments.
For example, in an ultimatum game one player has a strictly dominant strategy if the
player is self-interested but he or she does not choose this selfish strategy. See also
Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for more experimental evidence on unselfish preferences.
Given these observations, I ask a basic question: How does the existence of agents
exhibiting interdependent preferences change the mechanism design problem?
7There exists an extensive literature on mechanism design. We refer the reader to
Jackson (2003) for a survey on mechanism design literature. In those studies the main
focus is on either (the impossibility of) efficient or optimal mechanism design with
selfish agents. In contrast to previous literature, we are interested in characterizing
interim efficient mechanisms with unselfish agents. Interim is used to denote the
informational time frame: agents select their messages after receiving their signals
but before learning the signals of others. We assume that all decisions, including
whether to change the mechanism, are made at the interim stage. Interim efficiency
is a natural extension of efficiency to incomplete information environments. If a
mechanism is interim efficient, then it can never be common knowledge that there
is another feasible mechanism which makes some types of agents better off without
hurting other types of agents. This implies that any other mechanism would be
unanimously rejected by all agents and should thus not be observed in practice. We
show that these mechanisms correspond to decision rules based on modified virtual
cost-benefit criterion, together with the appropriate incentive taxes. Moreover, we
show that interim efficient decisions depend on the social concerns of the agents even
though classical efficient decisions do not depend on the social concerns of the agents.
There are a few papers that explore the properties of interim efficient allocation
rules for standard mechanism design environments with selfish agents. See Wilson
(1985) and Gresik (1991) for a characterization of ex ante efficient mechanisms for
bilateral trade environments (double auctions), and Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) for
a characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for public good environments.
8Our characterization is general and can be applied to different economic settings.
We provide applications for both public and private goods environments. In our
applications, efficient decisions are independent of the social concerns of the agents.
However, we show that interim efficient mechanisms produce public goods more often
as the degree of altruism in the preferences goes up. That is, inefficiencies in public
good production decreases as the agents care more about the welfare of the other
agents in the society. For bilateral trade environments, we show that these mecha-
nisms give the good to the agent with the highest positive modified virtual valuations.
If there is no buyer with a positive modified virtual valuation which is higher than
the virtual valuation of the seller, then the seller keeps the good. We also show that
altruistic agents trade more often than selfish agents. This means that there are some
information states of the economy where it is optimal to trade but selfish agents will
not trade and altruistic agents will trade. Moreover, altruistic agents do not trade
when it is not optimal to trade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we de-
scribe the environment and introduce the basic notation. In Section 2.3 we formulate
the set of constraints and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive
compatibility and individual rationality. The tools of mechanism design are used to
provide these necessary and sufficient conditions. Then, we present the characteri-
zation results and proofs. Section 2.4 provides applications of our characterization
for both public good and bilateral trade environments. Finally, we summarize the
findings of the paper and make some concluding remarks in Section 2.5. The proofs
9are delegated to the Appendix, Section 2.6.
2.2 The Model
Consider a Bayesian mechanism design framework with n agents. The set of agents is
denoted by N = {1, ..., n}. Each agent has a type θi which is her private information.
We assume that each agent knows her own type and does not know the types of the
other agents. Each θi is independently drawn from cumulative distribution function
F i(.) on Θi = [θi, θ
i
] with 0 ≤ θi ≤ θi < ∞. Types are drawn independently across
agents; that is, the θis are independent random variables. We denote a generic profile
of agent types by θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ Θ ≡ ×Ni=1Θi. For any θ ∈ Θ, we adopt the
standard notation so that θ−i = (θ1, ..., θi−1, θi+1, ..., θn), and θ = (θi, θ−i) where
f(θ) =
∏N
i=1 f
i(θi). Let X be a finite set of possible nonmonetary decisions, or
allocations (e.g., X could be a subset of an Euclidean space and represent the set of
possible allocations of private and public goods).
Let ∆(X) be the set of probability distributions on X. A mechanism ζ = (y, t)
consists of an allocation rule y and a payment rule t. Let yx(θ) denote the probability
of choosing x ∈ X, given the profile of types θ ∈ Θ. A feasible allocation rule (or
social choice function) y : Θ → ∆(X) is a function from agents’ reported types to
a probability distribution over allocations such that
∑
x∈X y
x(θ) = 1 and yx(θ) ≥ 0
for all θ ∈ Θ. We allow allocation rules to randomize over feasible allocations. Let
Y be the set of all possible allocation rules and Ω ⊆ Y be the set of all feasible
allocation rules. The payment rule t : Θ → RN is a map from the agents’ reported
10
types to monetary compensations where
∑N
i=1 t
i(θ) ≥ 0. This condition (ex-post
budget balance) requires that there is no outside source to finance the compensations.
Therefore, a mechanism cannot run a deficit.
The individual payoff function (or material utility) of an agent i given an allocation
rule y, and her monetary payment ti is
Πi(y, ti, θi) =
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(x, θi)− ti
where vi(x, θi) is agent i’s valuation of allocation x which depends on her private
information. We assume that vi(x, θi) is differentiable, monotone increasing, and
convex in θi for all i and x ∈ X.
Beyond her individual payoff, agent i cares about the payoffs of others:
ui(y, t, θ) = ρiΠi + (1− ρi)Π
=
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)V i(x, θ, ρi) + ρi(
∑
j∈N t
j
N
− ti)−
∑
j∈N t
j
N
where Π =
∑
j∈N Π
j
N
is the average payoff in the population and
V i(x, θ, ρi) = ρivi(x, θi) + (1− ρi)
∑
j∈N v
j(x, θj)
N
is the total value of allocation x for agent i . The constant ρi ∈ [0, 1] is an agent-
specific weighting factor showing each agent’s social concerns. If ρi = 1, the agent
has selfish preferences which do not directly depend on the well being of others. If
11
ρi < 1, the agent has altruistic preferences which are increasing in the well being of
others. Note that as ρi increases the degree of altruism in preferences goes down. If
all agents are identical in their social concerns ( ρi = ρj = ρ), and ρ = 0, the model
is a common value setting where full social preferences are in action and the society
is homogeneous. If ρ = 1, the model is equivalent to the standard mechanism design
environment with selfish agents. We assume that agents have identical social concerns
to simplify the analysis for the rest of the paper (ρi = ρj = ρ for all i, j ∈ N). The
model can also be extended to environments where agents are spiteful (ρ > 1).
We only consider direct mechanisms in which the set of reported types is equal
to the set of possible types in the rest of the paper. By the revelation principle, any
allocation rule that results from equilibrium in any mechanism is also an equilibrium
allocation rule of an incentive compatible, direct mechanism. Therefore, there is no
loss of generality in restricting our attention to these simple type of mechanisms.
Let U i(ζ, θi, si) be the interim expected utility of agent i when he reports si 6= θi,
assuming all other agents truthfully report their type. That is
U i(ζ, θi, si) = Eθ−i [u
i(y(si, θ−i), t(si, θ−i), θ)].
Denote U i(ζ, θi) ≡ U i(ζ, θi, θi). The ex-ante utility of agent i is
U i(ζ) = Eθ[u
i(y(θ), t(θ), θ)].
12
Define also the conditional expected payment function ai : Θi → R such that
ai(θi) = Eθ−i [t
i(θ)].
A mechanism is interim incentive compatible (IIC) if honest reporting of types
defines a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. That is ζ is IIC if and only if U i(ζ, θi) ≥
U i(ζ, θi, si) for all i, si, θi. We call a mechanism interim individual rational (IIR) if
every agent wants to participate in the mechanism: U i(ζ, θi) ≥ 0 for all i, θi. A
mechanism is ex ante budget balanced (EABB) if a mechanism designer does not
expect to pay subsidies to the agents, e.g., Eθ(
∑N
i=1 t
i(θ)) ≥ 0. A mechanism is
feasible if it satisfies IIC, IIR, and EABB.
A mechanism ζ is interim efficient (IE) if it is feasible and there is no other feasible
mechanism ζ̂ such that U i(ζ̂ , θi) ≥ U i(ζ, θi) for all i, θi and U i(ζ̂ , θi) > U i(ζ, θi) for
some i and for all θi ∈ Θ˜i ⊂ Θi, where Θ˜i has strictly positive measure relative to
Θi. IE is an extension of efficiency to the environments with private information.
A mechanism is IE if there does not exist an alternative feasible mechanism that
interim Pareto-dominates it. Note that the idea of Pareto-domination is applied to
the expected utilities after the agents have learned their types. IE mechanisms can
also be represented as the solutions to a set of maximization problems. A mecha-
nism ζ is an IE mechanism if and only if there exists λ = {λi : Θi → R+}Ni=1 with∫ θi
θi
λi(θi)dF i(θi) > 0 for some i, such that ζ maximizes
∑N
i=1
∫ θi
θi
λi(θi)U i(ζ, θi)dF i(θi)
subject to ζ is feasible. Note that the weight attached to an agent i can vary with
her type. See Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) for more on this. Thus, an IE mech-
13
anism maximizes weighted sum of agents’ utilities subject to IIC, IIR, and EABB
constraints. We could also use ex post budget balance condition. It turns out that
EABB is equivalent to ex post budget balance condition in our setting.
2.3 Results
Given welfare weights λ > 0, our main problem can now be stated as finding mecha-
nisms that maximize
N∑
i=1
∫ θi
θi
λi(θi)U i(ζ, θi)dF i(θi)
subject to IIC, IIR, EABB, and obvious quantity constraints.
We now proceed to characterize the complete set of interim efficient mechanisms.
We first start to reformulate the constraint set such that we can provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for IIC and IIR. The second step in the characterization involves
a general solution to the maximization problem with the constraints rewritten as
described below. The constraints for IIC correspond to the first-order and second-
order conditions of an individual optimization problem. Following the same idea in
Myerson (1981), I find the solution to the case where the second-order IIC condition
is not binding (regular problems). Then, I provide a sufficient condition in which the
solution to the regular problem coincides with the solution to the original problem.
The standard tools of mechanism design are used to get the following preliminary
results.
14
2.3.1 Preliminaries to the Main Results
IIC requires that it is a Bayesian equilibrium for each agent to report her type truth-
fully, i.e., none of the agents can obtain strictly higher payoffs by deviating individu-
ally. Let Si : Θi → R be agent i’s expected surplus function. Then given a mechanism
ζ surplus function is
Si(θi) := sup{U i(ζ, θi, si)|si ∈ Θi}.
This optimization problem determines the agent i’s optimal report. It is easy to see
that a mechanism is IIC if and only if Si(θi) = U i(ζ, θi) for all i, θi. In our frame-
work incentive compatibility can also be characterized by means of an envelope and
a monotonicity condition as in standard mechanism design problems. The following
result, which is useful in our characterization, states that the derivative of the ex-
pected marginal total value of type θi under the mechanism should be nondecreasing
and the expected utility function of that type is uniquely determined by the expected
utility of the lowest type and the allocation rule. The proof is similar to the selfish
preferences environment. A similar result is also proved by Rochet (1987) for linear
environments with selfish preferences.
Lemma 1 A mechanism is IIC if and only if
(si − θi)× (Qi(si, ρ)−Qi(θi, ρ)) ≥ 0 for all si, θi ∈ Θi (2.1)
15
U i(ζ, θi) = U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds (2.2)
where
Qi(θi, ρ) ≡
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
∂V i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
dF−i(θ−i).
The first condition is the monotonicity condition which states that the expected
marginal total value of agent i in her own type, Qi(θi, ρ), should be monotone in-
creasing in her own private information. This implies that ∂Q
i(θi,ρ)
∂θi
≥ 0. The second
condition is the envelope condition. The monotonicity condition has implications
only for allocation rules. Notice that the expected payment function ai is completely
determined by a constant ai(θi) and the allocation rule y. The constant of integration,
U i(ζ, θi) is uniquely determined by N constants a(θ) and y for all agents.
Now we can write expected budget surplus in an IIC mechanism using the result
above.
B(ζ) ≡
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
ti(θ)dF (θ) =
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
(ρti(θ) + (1− ρ)
∑
j t
j(θ)
N
)dF (θ)
=
N∑
i=1
(∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)V i(x, θ, ρ)dF (θ)− U i(ζ, θi)−
∫
Θi
[
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds]dF i(θi)
)
Using integration by parts,
=
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
V i(x, θ, ρ)− ∂V
i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)−
N∑
i=1
U i(ζ, θi).
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Let Φ(ζ, ρ) ≡∑Ni=1 ∫Θ∑x∈X yx(θ)(V i(x, θ, ρ)− ∂V i(x,θ,ρ)∂θi 1−F i(θi)f i(θi) ) dF (θ). Notice that
if ζ is EABB then B(ζ) ≥ 0. This also implies the mechanism designer does not expect
to pay subsidies to the agents.
IIR requires that each type of each agent must be at least as well off by partici-
pating as they would be by not participating at the interim stage. We assume that
outside options are exogenously given and without loss of generality normalized to
zero. We next combine IIR and IIC to get a useful result for later.
Lemma 2 An IIC mechanism ζ is IIR if and only if for all i ∈ N , U i(ζ, θi) ≥ 0.
2.3.2 Interim Efficient Mechanisms
Welfare weights play an important role in my analysis. Before stating the main
characterization, the following definition and lemma will be useful in reformulating
the original problem.
Definition 1 If λ0i ≡ ∫ θi
θi
λi(θi)dF i(θi) > 0, let Λi(θi) = 1
λ0i
∫ θi
θi
λi(s)dF i(s). If
λ0i = 0, let Λi(θi) = 0.
λ0i is agent i’s ex ante welfare weight relative to other agents. Λi(θi) is a relative
weight of agent i’s lower types given her private information.
Lemma 3 ∫ θi
θi
λi(θi)
(
U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds
)
dF i(θi)
=
17
λ0i
[
U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
(
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)Qi(θi, ρ)dF i(θi)
]
.
Now we can provide our first characterization by using the previous lemmas. This
result implies that the objective function is just a function of utilities of the lowest
types U i(ζ, θi) and the allocation rule y. It does not depend on the transfers anymore.
Theorem 1 A mechanism ζ = (y, a) is IE if and only if there exists non-negative
type-dependent welfare weights, {λi}Ni=1, where
∑
i∈N λ
0i > 0, and N constants,
{ci(θi)}Ni=1, such that (y, {ci(θi)}Ni=1) solves,
maxy∈Ω
N∑
i=1
λ0i
[
U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
(
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)Qi(θi, ρ)dF i(θi)
]
(2.3)
subject to
Φ(ζ, ρ)−
N∑
i=1
U i(ζ, θi) ≥ 0 (2.4)
U i(ζ, θi) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)V i(x, θi, θ−i, ρ)dF−i(θ−i)− ci(θi) ≥ 0 (2.5)
Qi(θi, ρ) monotone increasing for all i, θi. (2.6)
Following the same idea in Myerson (1981) we characterize the solution to the
problem in Theorem 1 for the case where monotonicity constraint is not binding.
In this case solution can be obtained by pointwise maximizing the integrand in the
objective function (2.3). Then we provide conditions under which the solutions to this
reduced problem satisfies the monotonicity constraint. When solutions to the original
problem and the reduced problem coincide, we refer to the problem as regular.
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Given non-negative type-dependent welfare weights, {λi}Ni=1, we can define the
Lagrangian function as
L(y, (ci(θi))Ni=1, γ, (µi)Ni=1) =
N∑
i=1
λ0i
[
U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
(
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)Qi(θi, ρ)dF i(θi)
]
+γ
[
Φ(ζ, ρ)−
N∑
i=1
U i(ζ, θi)
]
+
N∑
i=1
µi
(∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)V i(x, θi, θ−i, ρ)dF−i(θ−i)− ci(θi)
)
.
The first-order conditions with respect to γ (EABB multiplier) and with respect to
µi (IIR multiplier) imply that
γ ≥ 0, B(ζ) ≥ 0 and γB(ζ) = 0,
µi ≥ 0, U i(ζ, θi) ≥ 0 and µiU i(ζ, θi) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
The first-order condition with respect to ai(θi) yields −λ0i+γ−µi = 0. Then γ ≥ λ0i
for all i ∈ N . This implies the EABB constraint is always binding (γ > 0) since there
is i ∈ N such that λ0i > 0 and µi  0 for all i ∈ N . The intuition of this result is
the following. We assumed that contributions in excess are not socially valued. If the
EABB is not binding, a redistribution of budget surplus to the agents would result
in an interim Pareto improvement. If we assume that there is a seller (or collector)
who keeps the excess surplus, then excess contributions are not lost for everybody.
This implies the constraint might not be binding depending on the welfare weight of
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the seller.
Let λ = maxi∈N{λ0i}. Define also K = {k | λ = λ0k, ∀ k ∈ N}, the set of agents
who have the highest ex ante welfare weight, and M = {m | λ > λ0m, ∀ m ∈ N}, the
set of agents whose welfare weights are lower than the highest ex ante welfare weight,
where N = K ∪M . There are two possible cases:
Case 1: γ > λ. This implies for all i ∈ N , µi > 0 ⇒ U i(ζ, θi) = 0 ⇒ IIR
constraints are binding for all agents’ lowest types.
Case 2: γ = λ. This implies for each k ∈ K, γ = λ = λ0k ⇒ µk = 0⇒ Uk(ζ, θk) ≥
0 and for each m ∈ M , γ = λ > λ0m ⇒ µm > 0⇒ Um(ζ, θm) = 0⇒ IIR constraints
are binding for all agents’ lowest types in M and the constraints are not binding for
all agents in K.
If IIR constraints for the lowest types of agents with non maximal expected wel-
fare weight is not binding, redistribution of wealth to agents with maximal expected
welfare weight would increase the weighted welfare function. The following lemma
summarizes the discussion above.
Lemma 4
N∑
i=1
λ0iU i(ζ, θi) = γ
N∑
i=1
U i(ζ, θi)
= γΦ(ζ, ρ).
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Using the above result, the objective function (2.3) can be written as follows
N∑
i=1
[∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
V i(x, θ, ρ)− ∂V
i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)
+
λ0i
γ
∫
Θi
(
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)Qi(θi, ρ)dF i(θi)
]
=
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
[
V i(x, θ, ρ) +
∂V i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)]
dF (θ).
Suppose we are in Case 1. In this case both constraints are binding. This implies,
Φ(ζ, ρ) = 0
from EABB and
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)V i(x, θi, θ−i, ρ)dF−i(θ−i) = ci(θi) = ρai(θi)
from IIR. Therefore, we can uniquely solve for the set of expected payments of all
agents’ minimum types.
Suppose now we are in Case 2. The argument for each i ∈M is similar to Case 1.
On the other hand, for each i ∈ K the IIR constraint may not be binding. Therefore,
we need |K| constants to solve for the payment function. Note that the agents with
the maximal expected welfare weight share the remaining surplus (or cost) to make
the EABB constraint binding. This implies agents in set K will be residual claimants.
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When we combine both cases and rearrange terms, we get the following result.1
This result is simplified reformulation of Theorem 1 for regular problems. The utilities
of lowest types U i(ζ, θi) are explicitly entered into the objective function and the
constraints of the maximization problem reduce to two constraints representing the
EABB constraint for each of the two cases as discussed above.
Theorem 2 Suppose the type-dependent welfare weights are such that λ0i = λ > λ0j
for all j ∈ N\{i} and γ ≥ λ. Then, for regular problems, a mechanism ζ is IE if and
only if y ∈ ∆(X) simultaneously solves the following inequalities
max
y∈Ω
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
[
V i(x, θ, ρ) +
∂V i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)]
dF(2.7)
0 ≤ Φ(ζ, ρ) (2.8)
0 = (γ − λ)Φ(ζ, ρ). (2.9)
The payment function (if ρ 6= 0) is given by2:
∀ j 6= i, aj(θj) =
∫
Θ−j
∑
x∈X y
x(θ)V j(x, θ, ρ)dF−j(θ−j)− ∫ θj
θj
Qj(s, ρ)ds
ρ
, (2.10)
ai(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X y
x(θ)V i(x, θ, ρ)dF−i(θ−i)− Φ(ζ, ρ)− ∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds
ρ
. (2.11)
1For this result, we assume that |K| = 1. It is easy to generalize this result to the cases where
|K| 6= 1.
2If ρ = 0, any payment scheme that adds up to zero will work since in this case agents only care
about the average payment and we know that budget is always balanced.
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2.3.3 Modified Virtual Valuations
In this section we show the effects of interdependent preferences in our setting. Let
W i(x, θ, ρ, λi) = V i(x, θ, ρ) +
∂V i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)
. (2.12)
We call W i(x, θ, ρ, λi) as the (modified) virtual valuation of agent i for allocation
x following Myerson (1981). Rather than directly working with total valuations,
interim efficient mechanisms use the agents’ total valuations suitably adjusted. The
virtual valuation for a given allocation is equal to the agent’s total valuation for the
allocation, V i(x, θ, ρ), with two adjustments that depend on the distribution of types,
welfare weights, and social concerns of the agents. The first one, ∂V
i(x,θ,ρ)
∂θi
F i(θi)−1
f i(θi)
,
is due to the informational rent to be given for truthful revelation of the agent’s
private information. The second one is due to distortions arising from redistribution
of income (∂V
i(x,θ,ρ)
∂θi
λ0i
γ
1−Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
). Note that these adjustments are weighted with the
marginal total valuation of agent i for a given allocation and hence virtual valuations
also depend on the allocation.
The modified virtual valuations reduce to those given in Ledyard and Palfrey
(2007) if ρ = 1 and vi(xi, θ) = xiθi, which implies that valuations are independent.
For that case these authors show that
W i(θi, λi) = θi +
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
.
If valuations are linear in the allocation and ρ = 1, then virtual valuations are also
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linear in xi and agents are selfish. Then we can redefine modified virtual valuations
such that they are independent of the allocation.
2.3.4 A Sufficient Condition for Regularity
In this section we provide sufficient conditions under which the solution to the regular
problem coincide with the solution to the original problem in Theorem 1.
Substituting (2.12) into (2.7) gives us:
max
y∈F
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)W i(x, θ, ρ, λi)dF (θ). (2.13)
The regular problem to find IE mechanisms can now be stated as (y, a) is an interim
efficient mechanism if and only if the allocation rule y ∈ ∆(X) simultaneously solves
(2.13), (2.8), and (2.9), and the payment function a is given by (2.10) and (2.11).
The problem stated above has a simple solution defined by3
yx(θ, λ) =

1 if x = argmaxm∈X
∑N
i=1W
i(m, θ, ρ, λi)
0 otherwise.
(2.14)
This implies an IE mechanism assigns probability one to an allocation with the highest
sum of modified virtual valuations. Note that to find the interim efficient mechanism
we use the minimum possible γ ≥ λ¯ such that (2.8) and (2.9) are satisfied.
This solution also provides an algorithm to find the interim efficient mechanisms.
3For simplicity, we assume that there are no allocations x, y, x 6= y such that∑N
i=1W
i(x, θ, ρ, λi) =
∑N
i=1W
i(y, θ, ρ, λi). We can also use a random tie-breaking rule.
24
Firstly, given welfare weights, set γ = λ¯ and find the allocation rule yx(θ, λ) for each
θ ∈ Θ. If this solution satisfies (2.8) and (2.9) then the expected transfer functions
a(θ) are given by (2.10) and (2.11). Then, (y, a) is the solution. If the solution does
not satisfy the constraints, then for each γ > λ¯ find the allocation rule. Then, find the
minimum value of γ such that the allocation rule yγ satisfies the constraints. Given
the allocation rule, calculate the expected transfer functions aγ as before. Then,
(yγ, aγ) is the solution.
We now provide a condition under which the solution (2.14) and the condition
imply that the monotonicity constraint is satisfied.
Assumption 1 (a) W i(x, θ, ρ, λi) is non decreasing in θi for all i ∈ N , x ∈ X and
all θ ∈ Θ, and (b) ∂V i(x,θ,ρ)
∂θi
is non decreasing in x for all i ∈ N , all θ ∈ Θ, and all
x ∈ X.
Note that we did not make any assumption about how the total valuations depend
on the allocation up to now. Assumption 1 basically restricts the set of admissible
valuation functions and welfare weights such that the solution to the reduced problem
satisfies the monotonicity condition (2.1). Assumption 1(a) reduces to a joint condi-
tion on priors F i, welfare weights and the curvature of the total valuation functions.
We already know by the initial assumption that ∂V
i(x,θi,ρ)
∂θi
increases (decreases) when
θi increases (decreases). However, the allocation might also change as a result of
increase in an agent’s signal. Note that the allocation can not decrease due to As-
sumption 1(a). Assumption 1(b) guarantees that the derivative of the total valuation
functions ∂V
i(x,θ,ρ)
∂θi
are also non decreasing in x. For example, if priors are uniform on
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[0, 1], V i(x, θ, ρ) = x(ρθi + (1− ρ)
∑
j∈N θ
j
N
), and ρ = 0 then
W i(.) =
∑
j∈N θ
j
N
+
1
N
(θi − 1 + λ
0i
γ
(1− Λi(θi)).
So Assumption 1(a) requires ∂W
i
∂θi
≥ 0. This is true if and only if λi(θi) ≤ 2γ for
all i ∈ N and all θi ∈ Θi. We know that γ ≥ λ and welfare weights are always
non-negative. Therefore, this condition is satisfied for all possible welfare weights.
For general priors and social concerns, this assumption requires
γ ≥ λ
i(θi)
2f i(θi)−
∂fi(θi)
∂θi
(F i(θi)−Λi(θi))
f i(θi)
.
This implies Assumption 1(a) may not be satisfied for all welfare weights with arbi-
trary priors. We showed that with uniform priors the assumption can be satisfied for
all welfare weights and thus it is satisfied by all incentive efficient mechanisms. Note
also that the total valuation function satisfies Assumption 1(b).
Theorem 3 If each W i(.) and V i(.) satisfies Assumption 1, then the solution (2.14)
satisfies all constraints in Theorem 1.
2.4 Applications
Our characterization is general and can be applied to different economic settings.
In this section, we present the main intuition of the characterization by providing
simplified applications for both public and private goods environments where the
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private valuations are linear in types and allocation.
2.4.1 Public Goods
There are N people, i=1,...,N, who must decide on the level of a public good which
is produced according to constant returns to scale. In addition, they must decide
how to distribute the production costs. Let X = {0, 1} denote the possible values of
the public good. The cost of producing x ∈ X is equal to Kx. In our main model,
we assumed that social allocation is costless but it is easy to incorporate the cost of
social allocation to our model.
The individual payoff function of agent i, given a decision rule y and her monetary
payment ti, is
Πi(y, ti, θi) =
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(x, θi)− ti.
We had started with the assumption that agents not only care about their individual
payoffs but also they care about the payoffs of other agents,
ui(y, t, θ) = ρΠi + (1− ρ)Π.
For this application we assume that the total valuation functions have the following
form:
V i(x, θ, ρ) = x
(
ρθi + (1− ρ)
∑
j∈N θ
j
N
)
.4 (2.15)
4The private valuation of agent i is vi(x, θi) = xθi.
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This implies the utility function of agent i is
ui(y, t, θ) =
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)V i(x, θ, ρ) + ρ(
∑
j∈N t
j
N
− ti)−
∑
j∈N t
j
N
, (2.16)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the measure of social concerns. If ρ = 1, the model is equivalent
to the standard public good environment where agents are selfish. If ρ = 0, the
model is a common values setting where full social preferences are in action and the
society is homogeneous (every agent has the same valuation for the public good). If
1 > ρ ≥ 0, agents have interdependent preferences. Note that as ρ decreases the
degree of altruism in preferences goes up and the model converges to the full social
preferences setting.
For the regular case, given welfare weights λi : Θi → R+, an IE mechanism
satisfies:
max
y∈Ω
N∑
i=1
∫
Θ
(∑
x∈X
yx(θ)(W i(x, θ, ρ, λi)− K
N
x)
)
dF (θ) (2.17)
0 ≤ Φ(ζ, ρ)−
∫
Θ
K
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)xdF (θ) (2.18)
0 = (γ − λ)
[
Φ(ζ, ρ)−
∫
Θ
K
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)xdF (θ)
]
. (2.19)
Suppose IIR was not required. It is much easier to solve the problem without IIR
constraints. First-order conditions imply λ0i = γ = λ for all i ∈ N . Hence the ex-
ante welfare weights must all be equal. Otherwise, the solution does not exist, since
it is always possible to improve welfare by making arbitrarily large transfers between
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agents with different welfare weights. The problem stated above has a simple solution:
yx(θ, λ) =

1 if x = argmaxm∈X
∑N
i=1W
i(m, θ, ρ, λi)−Km
0 otherwise,
(2.20)
and the payment functions can be found using Theorem 2 after subtracting the ex-
pected cost of the public good from the constraint on the sum of the expected payment
of the lowest types of each agent.
The public good is produced if
N∑
i=1
θi + (ρ+
1− ρ
N
)
N∑
i=1
F i(θi)− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
≥ K.
The first best decision is to produce the public good when
N∑
i=1
V i(1, θ, ρ) =
N∑
i=1
V i(1, θ, ρ = 1) =
N∑
i=1
vi(1, θ) =
N∑
i=1
θi ≥ K.
Let Θe = {θ|∑Ni=1 θi ≥ K} and Θρ = {θ|∑Ni=1W i(.) ≥ K}. Efficiency dictates
that the probability of producing the public good does not depend on whether agents
are selfish or unselfish. In interim efficient mechanisms, there are distortions from
the first best due to informational rents, the type-dependent welfare weights and the
measure of social concerns ρ. Note that even though the sum of the valuations for
the public good is independent of the measure of social concerns, the production of
the public good depends on the interdependence among preferences.
Suppose λi(θi) is decreasing for all i and θi (lower types are weighted more heavily).
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This implies the aim of the planner is that agents valuing the public good more should
bear a larger share of the costs. Then,
∑N
i=1
F i(θi)−Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
< 0. This implies there is less
production than the ex post efficient mechanisms for all ρ since sum of the modified
virtual valuations is less than the sum of the valuations. Moreover, as ρ decreases,
or the degree of altruism in the preferences goes up, the public good is produced
more often. That is, when higher types are less heavily weighted than lower types,
underproduction is a more efficient way to relax incentive compatibility constraints
than transfers. However, incentive compatibility constraints are less binding as we
converge to the full social preferences environment (ρ decreases) and there is no need
to relax the incentive compatibility constraints. This leads to a relative increase in
the production of the public good.
Now, suppose λi(θi) is increasing for all i and θi (higher types are weighted more
heavily). Then,
∑N
i=1
F i(θi)−Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
> 0. This implies there is more production than
the ex post efficient mechanisms for all ρ since sum of the modified virtual valuations
is more than the sum of the valuations. Moreover, as ρ decreases, the public good
is produced less often. It is also easy to see that if λi(θi) = c ∈ R+ for all i and
θi, ex ante efficient public decisions which are also interim efficient correspond to the
classical first best decision (or ex-post efficient allocation). The following comparative
statistics result directly follows from the above discussion.
Proposition 1 If the welfare weights are decreasing in type, the public good is pro-
duced more often as the degree of altruism in preferences goes up.
Now suppose that IIR constraints are required. The main question is then whether
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the individual rationality constraint will be binding or not for the agent who is as-
signed the highest welfare weight. We know that individual rationality constraints
will be binding for all other agents since γ ≥ λ¯. Note that γ is found using the algo-
rithm in Section 1.3.4. Suppose γ > λ¯. This implies individual rationality constraints
are binding for all agents. For this case, virtual valuations are equivalent to5
W i(θ, ρ, λi) =
(
ρθi + (1− ρ)
∑
j∈N θ
j
N
+ (ρ+
1− ρ
N
)
(
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
))
.
(2.21)
The public good is produced if
N∑
i=1
θi + (ρ+
1− ρ
N
)
(
N∑
i=1
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)
≥ K. (2.22)
With IIR constraints, virtual valuations are lower for all agents. Hence interim ef-
ficient choice of the public good is always lower with the constraints than with-
out. This implies that in some cases it might be efficient to produce the pub-
lic good but there might not be enough surplus to cover the incentive costs with-
out violating individual rationality constraints. Note that the adjustment term,
(ρ + 1−ρ
N
)
(∑N
i=1
F i(θi)−1
f i(θi)
+ λ
0i
γ
1−Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)
, is always negative. If interim efficient trade
occurs, then
∑N
i=1 θ
i > K. This is because classical (or ex post) efficiency, interim
incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality are incompatible in our en-
vironment. IE mechanisms do not produce the public good when it is not optimal
5In this application the virtual valuations are linear in the allocation x since the valuation func-
tions are linear in x. We can redefine modified virtual valuations such that they will not depend on
the level of public good.
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or not classically efficient (
∑N
i=1 θ
i < K) to produce the public good, and IE mecha-
nisms may not produce the public good when it is optimal to produce (
∑N
i=1 θ
i ≥ K).
However, as degree of altruism in the preferences goes up the adjustment term be-
comes smaller. This implies agents earn less informational rents, the budget balance
constraint is relaxed and the constrained optimum is getting more efficient, since it
is easier to satisfy individual rationality constraints with relatively more unselfish
agents. That is, the inefficient provisioning of the public good will decrease as ρ de-
creases, and there will be fewer information states of the economy in which it might be
optimal to produce the public good but the public good is not produced. Moreover,
inefficiency in public good production is the smallest when full social preferences are
in action (ρ = 0). These observations lead to the following result.
Proposition 2 Inefficiencies in interim efficient public good provision decreases as
the degree of altruism in preferences goes up (Θe ⊇ Θρ′ ⊇ Θρ for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ [0, 1] such
that ρ > ρ′).
2.4.2 Bargaining: One Buyer and One Seller
There is a risk-neutral seller who wants to sell an indivisible object that she owns and
a risk-neutral buyer who wants to buy the object. The seller’s type is θs ∈ [θs, θs], and
the buyer’s type is θb ∈ [θb, θb]. We assume that [θs, θs] ∩ [θb, θb] 6= ∅. That is, there
are gains from trade for some information states of the economy. A nonmonetary
decision may be represented by a vector x = (xs, xb), where xs = 1 if the seller keeps
the good, xs = 0 if the seller sells the good, xb = 1 if the buyer gets the good, and
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xb = 0 if the buyer does not get the good. The set of possible allocations is then
X = {(1, 0), (0, 1)}. Agent i’s individual payoff depends on the decision rule y, her
private information θi and her monetary transfer ti,
Πi(y, ti, θi) =
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)vi(xi, θi)− ti.
Beyond her individual payoff, agent i ∈ {b, s} cares about the payoff of the other
agent,
ui(y, t, θ) =
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)V i(x, θ, ρ)− ρti − (1− ρ)t
s + tb
2
.
For this application we assume that total valuation functions have the following form:6
V i(x, θ, ρ) =
(
ρxiθi + (1− ρ)x
sθs + xbθb
2
)
.
If the parties do not reach an agreement, they get their outside options. The
seller’s outside option is U0s(θs) = 1+ρ
2
θs and U0b(θb) =
∫
Θs
1−ρ
2
θsdF s(θs) for the
buyer, the buyer’s expected value when he does not make any payments to the seller
and the seller keeps the good. Note that the interpretation of outside options is not
standard in our model. We could also set U0s(θs) = θs and U0b(θb) = 0. This would
imply interdependence among preferences are not observed if there is no trade.
IIR requires an agent’s net utility given incentive taxes to be non-negative for all
6If ρ = 1, the model is equivalent to the original Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) bargaining
problem with selfish agents.
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of that agent’s types:
U i(ζ, θi)− U0i(θi) = U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds− U0i(θi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈M, θi ∈ Θi.
This is only true if
U i(ζ, θi) +minθi
[∫ θi
θi
Qi(s)ds− U0i(θi)
]
≥ 0.
It is easy to see that IIR constraint is binding for the lowest possible type of the buyer
and for the highest possible type of the seller. Note that for the buyer individual
rationality is satisfied if and only if U b(ζ, θb) ≥ ∫
Θs
1−ρ
2
θsdF s(θs). For the seller,
individual rationality requires U s(ζ, θs) − ∫ θs
θs
Qs(a, ρ)da − 1+ρ
2
θ
s ≥ 0. The expected
surplus using our formulation in the paper can be written as
B(ζ) ≡
∑
i∈{b,s}
∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
V i(x, θ, ρ)− ∂V
i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
1− F i(θi)
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ)+
−U b(ζ, θb)− U s(ζ, θs).
Repeating the same arguments, an interim efficient mechanism maximizes
max
y∈Ω
∑
i∈{b,s}
∫
Θ
[∑
x∈X
yx(θ)(V i(x, θ, ρ) +
∂V i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
(
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+ (2.23)
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
+ (1− λ
0i
γ
)
I i(θi)
f i(θi)
)]
dF (θ)
0 ≤ Ψ(ζ, ρ) (2.24)
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0 ≤ γ − λ (2.25)
0 = (γ − λ)Ψ(ζ, ρ) (2.26)
where
I i(θi) =

1 if θi < argminθi
[
U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds− U0i(θi)
]
;
0 if θi ≥ argminθi
[
U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds− U0i(θi)
]
and
Ψ(ζ, ρ) =
∑
i∈{b,s}
[∫
Θ
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)
(
V i(x, θ, ρ) +
∂V i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ) +
min
θi
(∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds− U0i(θi)
)]
=
∫
Θ
y(0,1)(θ)
[
θb − θs + 1 + ρ
2
(
F b(θb)− 1
f b(θb)
− F
s(θs)
f s(θs)
)]
dF (θ).
The modified virtual valuation of the buyer is:
W b(x, θ, ρ, λb) = V b(x, θ, ρ) +
∂V b(x, θ, ρ)
∂θb
(
F b(θb)− 1
f b(θb)
+
λ0b
γ
1− Λb(θb)
f b(θb)
)
,
and the modified virtual valuation of the seller is
W s(x, θ, ρ, λs) = V s(x, θ, ρ) +
∂V s(x, θ, ρ)
∂θs
(
F s(θs)
f s(θs)
− λ
0s
γ
Λs(θs)
f s(θs)
)
.
An IE mechanism gives the good to the agent with the highest positive modified vir-
tual valuations. Trade will take place whenever the seller’s modified virtual valuation
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is below the buyer’s modified virtual valuation. This implies trade occurs if
θb − θs + 1 + ρ
2
(
F b(θb)− 1
f b(θb)
+
λ0b
γ
1− Λb(θb)
f b(θb)
− F
s(θs)
f s(θs)
+
λ0s
γ
Λs(θs)
f s(θs)
)
≥ 0.
The first best decision is to trade the good when θb ≥ θs. Efficient trade cannot
occur with probability one in interim efficient mechanisms. There are distortions from
the first best due to informational rents, redistribution of income, and our behavioral
assumption. Note that the sum of total valuations of agents is independent of the
degree of altruism in preferences. However, interim efficient trade depends on the
interdependence among preferences.
With IIR constraints, modified virtual valuation of the buyer is lower and modified
virtual valuation of the seller is higher than the case without IIR constraints. Hence
trade occurs less often with the constraints than without. It might be efficient to
trade in some cases but there might not be enough surplus to cover incentive costs
without violating individual rationality constraints.
Suppose the priors are uniform on [0, 1]. Then trade occurs if and only if
θb − θs ≥ 1 + ρ
3 + ρ
(
1− λ
0b
γ
(1− Λb(θb))− λ
0s
γ
Λs(θs)
)
.
In the ex ante efficient mechanism, which is also interim efficient, λs = λb = 1, trade
occurs if and only if
θb − θs ≥ (1 + ρ)(γ − 1)
(3 + ρ)γ − (1 + ρ) .
The probability of trade in an interim efficient mechanism can be higher or lower than
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the ex ante efficient mechanism depending on welfare weights. Note that the set of
ex ante efficient mechanisms is a subset of the set of interim efficient mechanisms. In
the ex ante efficient mechanism the seller adjusts her total valuation upward and the
buyer adjusts her total valuation downward. They are willing not to trade even if
trade is beneficial to both parties to get more favorable total payoffs. This may not
be the case in an interim efficient mechanism depending on welfare weights.
If we apply our algorithm from Section 1.3.4, we see that γ is positively correlated
with ρ. The following table summarizes the relationship among the resource feasibil-
ity Lagrangian multiplier (γ), the degree of altruism ρ, and information state of the
economy θ = (θb, θs) for which trade occurs.
ρ γ θb − θs ≥
0 1 0
0.3 1.15 0.08
0.6 1.3 0.17
1 1.45 0.25
Table 2.1: Relationship between ex ante efficient trade and the degree of altruism in
preferences.
Note that the probability of ex ante efficient trade is equal to the probability of
efficient trade when ρ = 0. In this case agents only care about the total valuations
but do not care about the transfers, so the problem is equivalent to finding efficient
mechanisms. This will not be true for all interim efficient mechanisms since welfare
weights might be type dependent. We can conclude from the table that the probability
of trade decreases as ρ increases since there will be less (θs, θb) for which trade occurs
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as ρ increases. This implies altruistic agents trade more often than selfish agents.
Moreover, selfish agents are more willing to risk losing beneficial trades to get a
more favorable payment than unselfish agents. The following result states that this
observation can easily be extended to all interim efficient mechanisms.
Proposition 3 Trade occurs more often as the degree of altruism in preferences goes
up (Θe ⊇ Θρ′ ⊇ Θρ for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ [0, 1] such that ρ > ρ′).
The above result implies that agents will trade more often as ρ decreases. That
is, there will be more information states of the economy (θ ∈ Θ) where it is interim
efficient to trade. Moreover, agents do not trade when it is not optimal (or not
classically efficient) to trade (θb− θs < 0) and they may not trade when it is optimal
to trade (θb−θs ≥ 0). However, there will be fewer information states of the economy
where trade does not occur but trade is optimal as the degree of altruism in the
preferences increases.
These results and characterization of interim efficient mechanisms can be applied
to markets with many buyers and many sellers and to auctions with one seller and
many buyers. For competitive environments such as markets and auctions, we do not
have any evidence to support unselfish preferences. We assume that self-interest as-
sumption provides a good description for most people’s behavior for these applications
(ρ = 1).
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have characterized interim efficient mechanisms for Bayesian envi-
ronments with interdependent preferences. We showed that interim efficient allocation
rules assign probability one to an allocation that maximizes sum of agents’ modified
virtual valuations that are carefully defined for these environments. We mostly con-
centrated on regular problems where we assumed that monotonicity constraint is not
binding and provided a sufficient condition for regular problems. The extension of
characterization to irregular problems remains open. We also provided some applica-
tions of this characterization for both public and private goods environments.
Our initial intention was to extend our analysis to the case where the individuals
share prior claims to the objects (dissolving a partnership). In that case individual
rationality constraints are type specific and the determination of buyers and sellers is
endogenous. Moreover, individual rationality constraints bind in the interior and this
interior point (or region) is also endogenous. This creates difficulties in separating
virtual valuations from the allocation rule, and hence virtual valuations are also en-
dogenous. Then, our formulation does not work for this case. Our conjecture is that
the set of initial shares for which efficient dissolution is possible extends as the degree
of altruism in preferences goes up. Extending the formulation to this problem is an
open question. We did not have this problem in our formulation because individual
rationality constraints are binding for the lowest or highest types of agents for all
incentive-compatible mechanisms.
One possibility for future research is to consider a model where the social con-
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cerns of agents are also private information. Then, types are multidimensional. This
extension appears to be a difficult open question since the problems with multidimen-
sional analysis are well known in mechanism design literature. Another possibility
for future research is to consider a mechanism design problem with Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) type of preferences where individuals are inequity-averse. This complicates the
mechanism design problem since this type of preferences introduces discontinuities.
The extension of our characterization to the Bayesian environments with inequity
averse agents and to the environments with private social concerns will be a subject
of our future research.
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2.6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. (⇒) Let si > θi. IIC implies U i(ζ, θi) ≥ U i(ζ, θi, si) and
U i(ζ, si) ≥ U i(ζ, si, θi) where
U i(ζ, θi, si) = U i(ζ, si)−
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(si, θ−i)V i(x(si, θ−i), si, θ−i, ρ)dF−i(θ−i)
+
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(si, θ−i)V i(x(si, θ−i), θ, ρ)dF−i(θ−i)
and
U i(ζ, si, θi) = U i(ζ, θi)−
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)V i(x(θ), θ, ρ)dF−i(θ−i)
+
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θ)V i(x(θ), si, θ−i, ρ)dF−i(θ−i).
This implies Qi(si, ρ) ≥ U i(ζ,si)−U i(ζ,θi)
si−θi ≥ Qi(θi, ρ) and hence Qi(θi, ρ) is nondecreas-
ing. Letting si → θi implies ∂U i(ζ,θi)
∂θi
= Qi(θi, ρ). Then U i(ζ, θi) = U i(ζ, θi) +∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds.
(⇐) Now suppose 1 and 2 hold. Then U i(ζ, si) − U i(ζ, θi) = ∫ si
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds ≥
(si − θi)Qi(θi, ρ). This implies, repeating the construction backwardly in the neces-
sary part, U i(ζ, θi) ≥ U i(ζ, θi, si) and U i(ζ, si) ≥ U i(ζ, si, θi). 
Proof of Lemma 2. IIR is satisfied if and only if U i(ζ, θi) ≥ 0 for all i, θi. By IIC
U i(ζ, θi) = U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N, θi ∈ Θi.
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That is, it requires
minθi∈Θi
[
U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds
]
≥ 0,
⇔
U i(ζ, θi) +minθi∈Θi
[∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)ds
]
≥ 0⇔ U i(ζ, θi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
The other direction is trivial since V i(x, θi) is monotone increasing in θi. 
Proof of Lemma 3. By changing the order of integration we get:
LHS = λ0iU i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)
[∫ θi
s
λi(θi)dF i(θi)
]
ds
= λ0i
[
U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(s, ρ)(1− Λi(s))ds
]
= λ0i
[
U i(ζ, θi) +
∫ θi
θi
(
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)Qi(θi, ρ)dF i(θi)
]
.

Proof of Theorem 1. Directly follows from Lemmas 1, 2, and 3. (2.4) is EABB,
(2.5) is IIR, and (2.6) is the first part of IIC. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Let λ = maxi∈N{λ0i}. Define also K = {k | λ = λ0k, ∀ k ∈ N},
the set of agents who have the highest ex ante welfare weight, and M = {m | λ >
λ0m, ∀ m ∈ N}, the set of agents whose welfare weights are lower than the highest
42
ex ante welfare weight, where N = K ∪M . There are two possible cases:
Case 1: γ > λ. This implies for all i ∈ N , µi > 0 ⇒ U i(ζ, θi) = 0 ⇒ IIR
constraints are binding for all agents’ lowest types.
Case 2: γ = λ. This implies for each k ∈ K, γ = λ = λ0k ⇒ µk = 0⇒ Uk(ζ, θk) ≥
0 and for each m ∈ M , γ = λ > λ0m ⇒ µm > 0⇒ Um(ζ, θm) = 0⇒ IIR constraints
are binding for all agents’ lowest types in M and the constraints are not binding for
all agents in K.
From Case 1 and 2, if U i(ζ, θi) 6= 0 for some i ∈ M ⊆ N then for all i ∈ M
ex ante welfare weights are equal to γ = λ = λ0i. This implies
∑N
i=1 λ
0iU i(ζ, θi) =
γ
∑N
i=1 U
i(ζ, θi) = γΦ(ζ, ρ). The second equality follows by EABB constraint which
is always binding. 
Proof of Theorem 2. It follows from Lemma 4 and the discussion for Case 1 and
2 as stated above. We know that IIR constraint is binding for the lowest types of
all −i. This implies ∑l∈N U l(ζ, θl) = U i(ζ, θi) = Φ(ζ, ρ) since EABB is always bind-
ing. Then, ρai(θi) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X y
x(θ)V i(x, θ, ρ)dF−i(θ−i) − U i(ζ, θi). By using the
envelope condition, we get the payment function of the agent with maximal welfare
weight. This implies agent i is the residual claimant. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The solution is constructed such that all constraints other
than monotonicity are satisfied. We only need to show that the solution satisfies the
monotonicity constraint. Suppose θi ≥ si, x = argmaxm∈X
∑N
i=1 W
i(m, θ, ρ, λi) and
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y = argmaxm∈X
∑N
i=1W
i(m, si, θ−i, ρ, λi). This implies x ≥ y by Assumption 1(a).
By Assumption 1(b),
Qi(θi, ρ) =
∫
Θ−i
∑
x∈X
yx(θi, θ−i)
∂V i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
dF−i(θ−i) =
∫
Θ−i
∂V i(x, θ, ρ)
∂θi
dF−i(θ−i)
≥ Qi(si, ρ) =
∫
Θ−i
∂V i(y, si, θ−i, ρ)
∂si
dF−i(θ−i).
This implies Qi(θi, ρ) is monotone increasing. Note that if x = y, Qi(θi, ρ) is obvi-
ously monotone increasing since we initially assumed that the valuation functions are
monotone increasing in type for all agents. Therefore, the solution (2.14) satisfies all
constraints in Theorem 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the welfare weights are decreasing in type. This
implies
∑N
i=1
F i(θi)−Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
< 0. We know that the probability of public good pro-
duction (the ratio of type profiles in which public good is produced) is equal to
Prob(yx=1ρ > 0) = Prob(θ|
∑N
i=1 θ
i + (ρ + 1−ρ
N
)
∑N
i=1
F i(θi)−Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
≥ K). Now con-
sider ρˆ > ρ and θ where yx=1(ρ, θ) = 1. It is easy to see that Prob(yx=1ρ > 0) ≥
Prob(yx=1ρˆ > 0) since there is ρˆ such that
∑N
i=1 θ
i + (ρ + 1−ρ
N
)
∑N
i=1
F i(θi)−Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
≥
K ≥ ∑Ni=1 θi + (ρˆ + 1−ρˆN )∑Ni=1 F i(θi)−Λi(θi)f i(θi) . Note also that if yx=1(ρ, θ) = 0 then
yx=1(ρˆ, θ) = 0. Next consider ρ > ρ˜ and θ where yx=1(ρ, θ) = 0. Then Prob(yx=1ρ˜ >
0) ≥ Prob(yx=1ρ > 0) since there is ρ˜ such that
∑N
i=1 θ
i+ (ρ˜+ 1−ρ˜
N
)
∑N
i=1
F i(θi)−Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
≥
K ≥ ∑Ni=1 θi + (ρ + 1−ρN )∑Ni=1 F i(θi)−Λi(θi)f i(θi) . Note also that if yx=1(ρ, θ) = 1 then
yx=1(ρ˜, θ) = 1. The proof for the case of increasing welfare weights is also similar. 
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Proof of Proposition 2. Given welfare weights and priors, let Θρ = {θ |∑
jW
j(θ, ρ, λi) ≥ K} be the set of types where public good is produced by an IE
mechanism ζ, given (ρ, γ). Let Θρ
′
= {θ|∑jW j(θ, ρ′, λi) ≥ K} be the set of types
where public good is produced by ζ given (ρ′, γ′). Note that for all ρ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and
all θ ∈ Θρ∗ ,∑Ni=1 θi ≥ K since efficiency, interim incentive compatibility, and interim
individual rationality are incompatible. This implies the adjustment term in modified
virtual valuations is always negative. Suppose without loss of generality ρ′ < ρ. We
want to show that there are more information states of the economy where the public
good is produced as the degree of altruism in preferences goes up, Θρ
′ ⊇ Θρ. Suppose
on the contrary there is θ such that θ ∈ Θρ and θ 6∈ Θρ′ . Then
N∑
i=1
θi + (ρ+
1− ρ
N
)
(
N∑
i=1
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)
≥ K
and
N∑
i=1
θi + (ρ′ +
1− ρ′
N
)
(
N∑
i=1
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
+
λ0i
γ′
1− Λi(θi)
f i(θi)
)
< K.
This is only possible if γ′ > γ. We also know that γ ≥ λ from first-order conditions.
This implies
Ψ(ζ, ρ)−
∫
Θρ
KdF (θ) ≥ Ψ(ζ, ρ′)−
∫
Θρ′
KdF (θ) = 0
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where
Ψ(ζ, ρ′) =
∫
Θρ′
(
N∑
i=1
θi + (ρ′ +
1− ρ′
N
)
N∑
i=1
F i(θi)− 1
f i(θi)
)
dF (θ).
Let, without loss of generality, Θρ = {θ|∑j θj > A(θ,K)} and Θρ′ = {θ|∑j θj >
B(θ,K)}. Since (ρ′ + 1−ρ′
N
)
∑N
i=1
F i(θi)−1
f i(θi)
> (ρ + 1−ρ
N
)
∑N
i=1
F i(θi)−1
f i(θi)
for all θ ∈ Θ,
B(θ,K) > A(θ,K). This implies if θ ∈ Θρ then θ ∈ Θρ′ , contradicting our initial
assumption. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Given welfare weights and priors, let Θρ be the set of types
where trade occurs given (ρ, γ) and Θρ
′
be the set of types where trade occurs given
(ρ′, γ′). Let, without loss of generality, ρ′ < ρ (altruism in the preferences increases).
We want to show that Θρ
′ ⊇ Θρ. Suppose on the contrary there exists θ such that
θ ∈ Θρ but θ 6∈ Θρ′ . (We know that either Θρ′ ⊇ Θρ or Θρ′ ⊆ Θρ.) This implies
θb − θs + 1 + ρ
2
(
F b(θb)− 1
f b(θb)
+
λ0b
γ
1− Λb(θb)
f b(θb)
− F
s(θs)
f s(θs)
+
λ0s
γ
Λs(θs)
f s(θs)
)
≥ 0
and
θb − θs + 1 + ρ
′
2
(
F b(θb)− 1
f b(θb)
+
λ0b
γ′
1− Λb(θb)
f b(θb)
− F
s(θs)
f s(θs)
+
λ0s
γ′
Λs(θs)
f s(θs)
)
≤ 0.
This is only possible if γ′ > γ ≥ λ. This implies Ψ(ζ, ρ′) = 0. Since ρ > ρ′ and trade
does not occur in ρ′, we have
θb − θs + 1 + ρ
2
(
F b(θb)− 1
f b(θb)
− F
s(θs)
f s(θs)
) ≤ θb − θs + 1 + ρ
′
2
(
F b(θb)− 1
f b(θb)
− F
s(θs)
f s(θs)
) ≤ 0.
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We know that trade occurs for θ in ρ. Hence,
Ψ(ζ, ρ) =
∫
Θρ
[
θb − θs + 1 + ρ
2
(
F b(θb)− 1
f b(θb)
− F
s(θs)
f s(θs)
)]
dF (θ) ≤ Ψ(ζ, ρ′) = 0.
This is a contradiction since γ is chosen by the algorithm such that Ψ(ζ, ρ) ≥ 0. 
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Chapter 3
Implementation of the Core in
College Admissions Problems
When Colleagues Matter
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3.1 Introduction
This paper presents simple sequential mechanisms that implement the core corre-
spondence in college admissions problems when students do care about who else goes
to the same college. In this matching market, there are two finite disjoint sets of
agents, the set of colleges C and the set of students S. Each college has a preference
relation over groups of students. Each student has a preferences relation over colleges
and groups of students (or classmates). A matching will be a particular assignment
of students to colleges. The solution concept, core, specifies the set of matchings we
might observe in practice.
It is well known that the core of this matching market can be empty. Dutta and
Masso´ (1997) present conditions under which the core is non-empty. They show that
if the students’ preferences are college-lexicographic and colleges’ preferences satisfy
substitutability, the core is non-empty. There are also other papers in which other
conditions are presented for non-emptiness of the core. See, for example, Revilla
(2004) and Pycia (2007). We first introduce a multi-stage mechanism that imple-
ments the core in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium on an unrestricted domain.
We also show that two-stage mechanisms cannot implement the core without these
restrictions.
In college admissions problems, Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) show that
two-stage simple mechanisms, such as the “students propose and colleges choose mech-
anism” and the “colleges propose and students choose” mechanism, implement the
core. We show that only extension of the colleges propose and students choose mecha-
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nism can implement the core under the restrictions that guarantee the non-emptiness
of the core (students’ preferences are college-lexicographic and colleges’ preferences
satisfy substitutability). Therefore, the symmetry between these two mechanisms
does not hold when students also care about their classmates.
Implementation of pairwise-stable outcomes in other matching markets has been
studied by several authors. Roth (1984), Gale and Sotomayor (1985), Alcalde (1996),
and Sotomayor (2003) deal with implementation in one-to-one matching markets.
Kara and So¨nmez (1995) show that the set of stable matchings, but no subset of
the core, is Nash implementable. Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) provide simple
mechanisms, which implement the core in SPNE, for many-to-one matching markets.
Sotomayor (2004) deals with the implementation problem in many-to-many matching
markets. This paper is the first paper which works on implementation problem for
many-to-one matching markets with preferences over colleagues. Finally, for general
cooperative games in coalitional form Perez-Castrillo (1994), Perry and Reny (1994),
Serrano (1995), and Serrano and Vohra (1997) address the question of implementation
of the core.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we give a brief intro-
duction to college admissions problems when colleagues matter and define our notion
of subgame perfect implementation. Section 3.3 presents the sequential matching
mechanism and we show that the matching mechanism implements in subgame per-
fect equilibrium the core correspondence in our framework. Section 3.4 introduces
a two-stage simple mechanism which can implement the core when the core is non-
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empty. In Section 3.5 we show that if we exchange the roles of colleges and students,
the two-stage simple mechanism cannot implement the core. The concluding remarks
follows in Section 3.6.
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 The Model
We consider an extended version of a college admissions problem with n students and
m colleges. Let S = {s1, ..., sn} be a set of students and C = {c1, ..., cm} be a set of
colleges. Each college ci has a preference P (ci) defined over groups of students 2
S.
Each si has a preference P (si) defined over (C × Ssi) ∪ {(∅, ∅)}, where Ssi = {A|A ∈
2S, si ∈ A} is the set of subsets of S which contains si. Preferences are linear orders.
A preference profile is a list P = (P (x))x∈C∪S ∈ P. We assume that being unmatched
or ∅ is not the last choice for each college.
A matching is a mapping µ from C ∪ S into 2S ∪ (C × Ssi) ∪ {(∅, ∅)} which
satisfies for all ci ∈ C and si ∈ S:
(1) µ(si) ∈ (C × Ssi) ∪ {(∅, ∅)},
(2) µ(ci) ∈ 2S,
(3) If si ∈ µ(ci) then µ(si) = (ci, µ(ci)),
(4) If µ(si) = (cj, S
′) then µ(cj) = S ′.
µ(si) = (∅, ∅) means that the student si is not matched to any college. Similarly,
if µ(ci) = ∅ then there are no students matched to college ci. Given a set of students
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A ⊆ S, we denote by Ch(A,P (c)) the maximal element on 2A under the linear order
P (c).
A matching µ is individually rational if no student prefers to be unmatched
and no college prefers to be matched with a subset of the current set of students.
Formally, for all si ∈ S and all ci ∈ C, µ(si)P (si)(∅, ∅) and µ(ci) = Ch(µ(ci), P (ci)).
LetM be the set of all matchings andN be the set of individually rational matchings.
Given any profile of preferences P , a matching µ is in the core, denoted C(P ), if
there is no C ′ ⊆ C, S ′ ⊆ S, and a matching µ′ such that:
1. C ′ ∪ S ′ 6= ∅;
2. For all c ∈ C ′ and s ∈ S ′, µ′(c) ∈ 2S′ and µ′(s) ∈ C ′ × S ′s ∪ {(∅, ∅)};
3. For all a ∈ C ′ ∪ S ′, µ′(a)R(a)µ(a);
4. There exists a ∈ C ′ ∪ S ′ such that µ′(a)P (a)µ(a).
If such an C ′, S ′, and µ′ exist, then we say that µ is blocked by C ′∪S ′. It is also easy
to see that if a matching is not in the core, then either it is not individually rational
or it is blocked by a single college and some students. Hence the following definition is
equivalent to the above core definition.1 A matching is in the core if it is individually
rational and there does not exist a student-group–college pair (B, c) ∈ 2S × C where
B ∩ µ(c) = ∅ and A ⊆ µ(c) such that for all s′ ∈ A ∪ B, (c, A ∪ B)P (s′)µ(s′) and
A ∪BP (c)µ(c).
Given a set of students A ⊆ S, we denote by Ch(A,P (c)) the maximal element
on 2A under the linear order P (c). A matching µ is pairwise-stable if there is no
1See Echenique and Yenmez (2007) for a proof.
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pair (s, c) ∈ S × C such that s 6∈ µ(c) implies s ∈ Ch({s} ∪ µ(c), P (c)) and for all
s′ ∈ Ch({s} ∪ µ(c), P (c)) implies (c, Ch({s} ∪ µ(c), P (c)))P (s′)µ(s′). If there exists
such a pair, we will say that µ is pairwise-blocked by (s, c). Let S(P ) be the set of
pairwise-stable matchings.
The following result states the relationship between the core and pairwise-stable
matchings. The core is a subset of the set of pairwise-stable matchings. A proof is
given by Echenique and Yenmez (2007).
Proposition 4 C(P ) ⊆ S(P ).
In the classical college admission problems where students are indifferent about their
colleagues, the set of pairwise-stable matchings coincides with the core when colleges’
preferences satisfy substitutability.2 That is, for any student s 6= s′, if s belongs to
Ch(A,P (c)), then she will also belong to Ch(A \ {s′}, P (c)). Moreover, the substi-
tutability assumption guarantees non-emptiness of the core and implies that the core
has a lattice structure.
In our setting the core can be empty. Dutta and Masso´ (1997) show that the set
of matchings in the core remains non-empty when students’ preferences are college-
lexicographic and colleges’ preferences satisfy substitutability. That is student si’s
preferences are college-lexicographic if there is a strict ordering P i over colleges such
that for all (C, S), (C ′, S ′), (C 6= C ′), (C, S)P (si)(C ′, S ′)⇔ CP iC ′, and (C, S)P (si)si ⇔
CP isi. Pycia (2007) also presents a sufficient and, in certain sense, necessary condi-
tion for non-emptiness of the core.
2See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for more on this.
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3.2.2 Subgame Perfect Implementation
We now introduce our definition of subgame perfect implementation. By a sequential
game form, we mean a finite-horizon extensive game form with perfect information.
A sequential game form Γ is said to (fully) implement in subgame perfect equilibrium
a solution = if for every preference profile P ∈ P, =(P ) is the unique pure strategy
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game (Γ, P ). A sequential game form
Γ is said to partially implement in subgame perfect equilibrium a solution = if for
every preference profile P , the pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes
of the game (Γ, P ) is a subset of =(P ). By a sequential game form Γ = (M,h) =
(
∏
i∈N Mi, h), we mean a finite horizon extensive game form with perfect information
where Mi is agent i’s strategy space and h : M →M is an outcome function.
Let SPNE(Γ, P ) denote the set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria for
the game (Γ, P ) and let SP (Γ, P ) = h(SPNE(Γ, P )) denote the set of all outcomes
corresponding to the subgame perfect equilibria of (Γ, P ). Then Γ is said to (fully)
implement the core in subgame perfect equilibrium if SP (Γ, P ) = C(P ) for all P ∈ P.
3.3 The Matching Mechanism
Before defining our mechanism (or game form), we need some additional notation. A
college-permutation is a bijection pii ∈ Π from C to C. Given a profile of permutations
pi = (pii)i∈C , let f(pi) = pic1 ◦ ... ◦ picm be the composition of the permutations and
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fi(pi) be the i-th college of f(pi).
3 This type of permutation is useful in endogenously
defining the order of moves in our sequential game form. Note that any i ∈ C can
make a unilateral change in pii to make itself the first player in the order of f .
We can now define the matching mechanism which is a sequential game form that
implements the core.
In stage 1, every college ci simultaneously announces an individually rational
matching µci ∈ N and a permutation pici ∈ Π. If for any ci and cj, µci 6= µcj ,
then the game ends with µ(fi(pi)) = ∅ for all i < m and µ(fm(pi)) ∈ 2S such that
∅P (fm(pi))µ(fm(pi)). If µci = µcj = µ1 for all ci, cj ∈ C, then proceed to stage 2.
In stage 2, a college f1(pi) announces the set of students Sf1(pi) ⊆ S that it wants to
admit. Students who received an offer from the college respond sequentially to this
proposal (the order of students is fixed and the order is not important to the results).
If all students in Sf1(pi) accept the offer, then we proceed to stage 3. If any student
in Sf1(pi) rejects the proposal, the game ends with µ
2 = µ1 as the outcome. In stage
3, a college f2(pi) announces the set of students Sf2(pi) ⊆ S \ Sf1(pi) that it wants to
admit. Students who received an offer from the college respond sequentially to this
proposal. If all students in Sf2(pi) accept the offer, then we proceed to stage 4. If any
student in Sf2(pi) rejects the proposal, then the game ends with µ
3 as the outcome.
Outcomes of the game form when a student rejects a proposal is formally defined in
the next paragraphs.
...
...
3This type of permutation device is proposed by Thomson (2005) in implementation of the “no-
envy” correspondence and its variants in abstract economic environments.
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In stage m+ 1, a college fm(pi) announces the set of students Sfm(pi) ⊆ S \ ∪i<mSfi(pi)
that it wants to admit. Students who received an offer from the college respond
sequentially to this proposal. If all students in Sfm(pi) accept the offer, then µ(fi(pi)) =
Sfi(pi) for all i ≤ m, µ(si) = (fj(pi), Sfj(pi)) for all students such that si ∈ Sfj(pi), and
any student who did not receive any offer is unmatched. If any student in Sfm(pi)
rejects the proposal, the game ends with µm+1 as the outcome.
To formally summarize, the matching mechanism Γ is defined as follows:
Stage 1. Every college ci simultaneously announces η
1
ci
∈ N × Π.
If for any ci and cj, µci 6= µcj , then the game ends with µ(fi(pi)) = ∅ for all i < m
and µ(fm(pi)) ∈ 2S such that ∅P (fm(pi))µ(fm(pi)). If µci = µcj = µ1 for all ci, cj ∈ C,
then go to the next stage.
Stage 2. The college f1(pi) announces a set of students η
2
f1(pi)
= Sf1(pi) ⊆ S. Then,
each si ∈ Sf1(pi) sequentially announces λ2si ∈ {“accept”, “reject”}.4
If there is si ∈ Sf1(pi) such that λ2si = “reject”, the game ends with µ2 = µ1 as the
outcome. Otherwise, go to the next stage.
Stage 3. The college f2(pi) announces a set of students η
3
f2(pi)
= Sf2(pi) ⊆ S \ Sf1(pi).
Next, each si ∈ Sf2(pi) sequentially announces λ3si ∈ {“accept”, “reject”}.
If λ3si = “accept” for all si ∈ Sf2(pi), then go to the next stage. If there is si ∈ Sf2(pi)
such that λ3si = “reject”, the game ends with µ
3 as the outcome where;
µ3(f1(pi)) = Sf1(pi), µ
3(si) = (f1(pi), Sf1(pi)) for all si ∈ Sf1(pi),
4We assume that each student announces “accept” if she is indifferent between announcing “ac-
cept” and “reject”. The order of students who respond to the offer of the college is fixed in every
stage and the order is not important to the results.
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∀ 1 < i ≤ m, µ3(fi(pi)) =

µ1(fi(pi)) if µ
1(fi(pi)) ∈ S \ Sf1(pi)
∅ otherwise.
and
∀ si ∈ S \ Sf1(pi), µ3(si) =

(fi(pi), µ
1(fi(pi)) if µ
1(fi(pi)) ∈ S \ Sf1(pi)
(∅, ∅) otherwise.
...
...
Stage m+1. The college fm(pi) announces a set of students η
m+1
fm(pi)
= Sfm(pi) ⊆ S \
∪i<mSfi(pi). Then, each si ∈ Sfm(pi) sequentially announces λm+1si ∈ {“accept”, “reject”}.
If λm+1si = “accept” for all si ∈ Sfm(pi), then the game ends with µ(fi(pi)) = Sfi(pi)
for all i ≤ m, µ(si) = (fj(pi), Sfj(pi)) for all students such that si ∈ Sfj(pi) and any
student who did not get any offer is unmatched, as the outcome. If there is si ∈ Sfm(pi)
such that λm+1si = “reject”, the game ends with µ
m+1(fi(pi)) = Sfi(pi) for all i < m,
µm+1(fm(pi)) = ∅, µm+1(sk) = (fi(pi), Sfi(pi)) for all sk ∈ Sfi(pi) and µm+1(sj) = (∅, ∅)
for all sj ∈ S \ ∪i<mSfi(pi) as the outcome.
Note that in any stage if a college announces the empty set, then we directly move
to the next stage and the college is unmatched as an outcome of the game induced
by our game form.
3.3.1 Implementing the Core
In our setting, the core might be empty even if we assume that colleges’ prefer-
ences satisfy substitutability. We need very strong assumptions on the preferences
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to guarantee the non-emptiness of the core. In our main result, we do not put these
restrictions on the preferences and we characterize the core as the subgame perfect
equilibrium outcomes of the game induced by the matching mechanism. This also
implies in a matching market with an empty core, the subgame perfect equilibrium
outcomes of the game form are also empty. The following is our main result.
Theorem 4 The matching mechanism Γ implements in subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium the core of college admission problems with preferences over colleagues.
The main structure of the proof is the following. We first assume the existence of
the core and pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, we characterize pure
strategy subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as the core. We will also show that
the core is empty if and only if there does not exist a subgame perfect equilibrium
whose proof directly follows from the proof of our main result.
Proof. We fix P ∈ P. First, we prove that C(P ) ⊆ SP (Γ, P ). Let µ ∈ C(P ) and
consider the following strategy profile: (i) η1ci = (µ, pi
I
ci
) = (µ, piI) and η1si = pi
I
si
= piI
for all ci ∈ C and all si ∈ S, where piI is the identity permutation. (ii) Sfi(pi) =
µ(fi(pi)) for all i ≤ m, where fi(pi) = ci for all ci ∈ C, since every agent announces
the identity permutation. (iii) For all si ∈ Sft−1(pi), all 2 ≤ t ≤ m+ 1 and all si ∈ S,
λtsi = “accept” if and only if (ft−1(pi), Sft−1(pi))R(si)µ
t(si).
We only need to check that this strategy profile is an equilibrium. Since µ ∈ C(P ),
there is no blocking student-group–college pair. This implies no college can gain
by announcing Sfi(pi) 6= µ(fi(pi)) since it will be rejected by at least one student
who got offer from the college fi(pi). Therefore, it is a dominant strategy for all
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fi(pi) ∈ C to announce Sfi(pi) = µ(fi(pi)). This also implies no college can gain by
announcing a different permutation and hence changing the order of colleges. It is also
easy to see that announcing “accept” is an optimal strategy if the condition in (iii)
holds for all students. Note that we assume that if a student is indifferent between
announcing “accept” and “reject”, she announces without loss of generality “accept”.
An equilibrium path corresponding to the above strategy profile is one where every
college makes an offer to the students with whom she is matched in the core matching
and all students announce “accept”. The equilibrium outcome corresponding to the
strategy profile is µ. Thus, µ ∈ SP (Γ, P ), which implies C(P ) ⊆ SP (Γ, P ).
Now, we show that SP (Γ, P ) ⊆ C(P ). Suppose by the way of contradiction
that there is a matching µ such that µ ∈ SP (Γ, P ) and µ 6∈ C(P ). Then µ is not
individually rational or there exists a student-group–college pair (B, c) ∈ 2S × C
which blocks µ. The first case is not possible because each student by rejecting a
proposal can be single or guarantee an individually rational match since µ1 ∈ N .
Moreover, it is easy to see that in every SPNE, µci = µcj = µ
1 for all ci, cj ∈ C.
If this is not the case, college fm(pi) can gain by announcing different permutation
since ∅P (fm(pi))µ(fm(pi)). Then we move to stage 2 in every SPNE. This implies
each college cannot be matched with unacceptable set of students since each college
has the option of remaining single by announcing the empty set. Now, consider the
second case. We know that B ∩ µ(c) = ∅ and there is A ⊆ µ(c) such that for all
s′ ∈ A ∪ B, (c, A ∪ B)P (s′)µ(s′) and A ∪ BP (c)µ(c). We claim that c 6= f1(pi).
Suppose c = f1(pi). Then η
2
f1(pi)
= B ⊆ S and each student si in B accepts this offer.
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This implies µ(c) = B, a contradiction. Suppose c = fk(pi) where 1 < k ≤ m. Then
fk(pi) can make a unilateral change in pifk(pi) to make itself the first announcing college
and announce η2c = B. Each student in B accepts this offer. This implies college c
was not playing its best response, a contradiction to µ ∈ SP (Γ, P ).
Corollary 1 For all P ∈ P, C(P ) = ∅ ⇔ SPE(Γ, P ) = ∅.
Proof. Immediately follows from our main result.
Corollary 2 The matching mechanism Γ partially implements in subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium the pairwise stable correspondence of college admission problems
with preferences over colleagues.
Proof. Follows from our main result and Proposition 4.
3.4 The Colleges Propose and Students Choose
Mechanism
This mechanism is widely studied in subgame perfect implementation of the core cor-
respondence of many-to-one and many-to-many matching models. See, for example,
Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) for college admissions problems and Sotomayor
(2004) for many-to-many matching markets. In this mechanism, each college selects
the set of potential students. Then, once each student receives the admission letters,
she accepts her most preferred college by also considering the classmates. In this
section we show that extension of such a two-stage game to our environment cannot
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implement the core in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium without strong restrictions
to the preferences of colleges and students.
Consider the following mechanism, called ΓCS. This is a two-stage mechanism.
In this mechanism, offers are made by colleges and students select the best college
by also considering the students who were also admitted to the same college. In the
first stage, colleges have to decide simultaneously. Each college message space is 2S.
In the second stage, students knowing colleges’ announcements select simultaneously
the college in which they want to study and their classmates.
Given this strategy space, outcome function hCS selects a matching µ such that:
µ(s) =

(m1(s),m2(s)) if m(m1(s)) = m2(s) for all s ∈ m2(s)
(∅, ∅) otherwise,
and, for each college c ∈ C,
µ(c) =

m(c) if m1(s) = c and m2(s) ⊇ m(c) for all s ∈ m(c)
∅ otherwise.
This mechanism ΓCS also cannot implement in SPNE the core correspondence of col-
lege admissions problems with preferences over colleagues without strong restrictions
on the preferences. The following example shows that there is a preference profile P
such that C(P ) ⊂ SP (ΓCS, P ) where C(P ) = ∅.
Example 1 Consider two colleges c1, c2 and three students s1, s2, s3 with the following
preference profile P :
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P (c1) : {s1, s2}, {s2, s3}
P (c2) : {s1, s3}
P (s1) : (c2, {s1, s3}), (c1, {s1, s2})
P (s2) : (c1, {s1, s2}), (c1, {s2, s3})
P (s3) : (c1, {s2, s3}), (c2, {s1, s3}).
This notation means that c1 prefers {s1, s2} to {s2, s3}. Only acceptable sets of
students for c1 are listed. That is, potential groups of students not listed are worse
for c1 than being single.
For this example Echenique and Yenmez (2007) show that C(P ) = ∅ using their
algorithm. We show that SP (ΓCS, P ) 6= ∅ for this example. Consider the following
set of strategies:
m(c1) = {s2, s3} ; m(c2) = {s1, s3} or ∅
m(s1) = (c2, {s1, s3}) ; m(s2) = (c1, {s2, s3}) ; m(s3) = (c1, {s2, s3}).
This constitutes a SPNE for the game ΓCS whose outcome coincides with µ where
µ =
c1 c2
s2s3 ∅
µ ∈ SP (ΓCS, P ) since college one and other students cannot reach higher utility
by deviating unilaterally. Suppose college one c1 deviates and announces m
′(c1) =
62
{s1, s2}. This leads to the following matching µ′:
µ′ =
c1 c2
∅ s1s3 .
However, {s2, s3}P (c1)∅. As a result µ ∈ SP (ΓCS, P ) but C(P ) = ∅. This implies the
extension of the “colleges propose and students choose” mechanism cannot implement
the core correspondence with an unrestricted domain of preferences. That is: C(P ) ⊂
SP (ΓCS, P ).
In the next result, we will assume that workers’ preferences are firm-lexicographic
and colleges’ preferences over sets of students satisfy substitutability. We show that
with these strong restrictions on preferences, the core correspondence can be imple-
mented by the ΓCS mechanism.
Theorem 5 If students’ preferences are college-lexicographic and colleges’ prefer-
ences over sets of students satisfy substitutability then the mechanism ΓCS implements
in SPNE the core correspondence.
Proof. First, we show that every SPNE outcome is in the core. SP (ΓCS, P ) ⊆
C(P ) 6= ∅. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a matching µ such that
µ ∈ SP (ΓCS, P ) and µ 6∈⊆ C(P ). Then µ is not individually rational or there exists
a student-group–college pair (B, c) ∈ 2S × C which blocks µ. The first case is not
possible because each student si can remain unmatched by reporting m
′(si) = (∅, ∅)
and for each college cj, Ch(µ(cj), P (cj)) = µ(cj). Suppose there is a college c such that
D = Ch(µ(c), P (c)) ⊂ µ(c). Then college c can be matched with the set of students
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D by reporting m′(c) = D by the construction of the mechanism, a contradiction to
µ ∈ SP (ΓCS, P ). Now consider the second case. We know that B ∩ µ(c) = ∅ and
there is A ⊆ µ(c) such that for all s′ ∈ A∪B, (c, A∪B)P (s′)µ(s′) and A∪BP (c)µ(c).
This implies college c can be better off by announcing m′(c) = A ∪B 6= µ(c). Notice
that in the second stage for all si ∈ A ∪ B, m′1(si) has to be equal to college c
since students’ preferences are college-lexicographic. That is, for all s ∈ B, cPsµ1(s).
Moreover, m′2(si) = A ∪ B for all si ∈ A ∪ B since the students play their best
response after knowing the announcements of the colleges. This cannot be the case
if µ ∈ SP (ΓCS, P ), a contradiction.
Now, we show that C(P ) ⊆ SP (ΓCS, P ). Let µ ∈ C(P ) 6= ∅. Consider the
following strategies for the agents. For each college cj ∈ C, its message is m(cj) =
µ(cj). In the second stage, for each student si, her message is m(si) = µ(si). Clearly,
µ ∈ SP (ΓCS, P ). We only need to show that this strategy profile is an equilibrium.
Suppose by way of contradiction there is a college cj who can reach higher utility
by deviating to m′(cj) = µ′(cj) = A and hence AP (cj)µ(cj). Since µ is individually
rational, µ(cj) = Ch(µ(cj), P (cj)). This implies A 6⊆ µ(cj) but there is a set of
students B ⊂ A such that B ⊂ µ(cj) and A\B 6∈ µ(cj). This implies for all s ∈ A\B,
cjPsµ1(s) since there exists a strict order Ps over colleges. However, we know that µ ∈
C(P ) and hence there is a student s′ ∈ B 6= ∅ such that (cj, µ(cj))P (s′)(cj, A). This
implies m′(s′) = m(s′) = µ(s′) = (cj, µ(cj)) and college cj cannot be matched to the
set of students A by construction of the mechanism (µ′(cj) 6= hcj(m′)), a contradiction
to our supposition. Moreover, a student cannot deviate since her dominant strategy
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is to choose the college that wants her. Therefore µ is a SPNE. This completes the
proof.
3.5 The Students Propose and Colleges Choose
Mechanism
In this mechanism, each student selects the college at which she wants to study and a
potential set of classmates. Then, once each college has received all of the application
forms, it accepts its most preferred set of students. In this section we show that
if we exchange the role of students and colleges, the core correspondence cannot be
implemented with or without strong restrictions to the preferences of colleges and
students
Let ΓSC be the “students propose and college choose mechanism”. In the first
stage, each student selects the college at which she wants to study and set of students
with whom she wants to go to the college. That is m(s) = (m1(s),m2(s)) ∈ (C×Ss)∪
{(∅, ∅)} for all students. At the second stage each college, knowing the announcements
of the students, accepts its most preferred set of students. Each college message space
is equivalent to 2S.
Given this strategy space, outcome function hSC selects a matching µ such that:
for any student s ∈ S,
µ(s) =

(m1(s),m2(s)) if m(m1(s)) = m2(s) for all s ∈ m2(s)
(∅, ∅) otherwise,
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and, for each college c ∈ C,
µ(c) =

m(c) if m1(s) = c and m2(s) ⊇ m(c) for all s ∈ m(c)
∅ otherwise.
The following example shows that this mechanism ΓSC cannot implement in SPNE
the core correspondence of college admissions problems with preferences over col-
leagues without strong restrictions on the preferences. That is there is a preference
profile P such that C(P ) 6= SP (ΓSC , P ).
Example 2 Consider two colleges c1, c2 and four students s1, s2, s3, s4 with the fol-
lowing preference profile P :
P (c1) : {s1, s2, s4}, {s1, s3, s4}, {s1}, {s2}, {s3}
P (c2) : {s2, s3, s4}, {s3}, {s2}
P (s1) : (c1, {s1, s2, s4}), (c1, {s1, s2}), (c1, {s1, s3}), (c1, {s1})
P (s2) : (c2, {s2, s3, s4}), (c1, {s1, s2, s4})
P (s3) : (c2, {s2, s3, s4}), (c2, {s3})
P (s4) : (c1, {s3, s4}), (c2, {s2, s3, s4}), (c1, {s1, s2, s4}).
This notation means that c1 prefers {s1, s2, s4} to {s1, s3, s4}, {s1, s3, s4} to {s1}, and
so on. Only acceptable students for c1 are listed. That is, potential groups of students
not listed are worse for c1 than being single.
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Now, lets look at the following two matchings,
µ1 =
c1 c2
s1 s2s3s4
µ2 =
c1 c2
s1s2s4 s3 .
It is easy to see that µ1 ∈ C(P ) and µ2 can be supported in SPNE by strategies
m(c1) = {s1, s2, s4}, m(c2) = {s3}, m(s1) = (c1, {s1, s2, s4}), m(s2) = (c1, {s1, s2, s4}),
m(s3) = (c2, {s3}), and m(s4) = (c1, {s1, s2, s4}). That is µ2 ∈ SP (ΓSC , P ). However,
it can be checked that µ2 is blocked by 〈{c2}, {s2, s3, s4}, µ1〉. This implies C(P ) 6=
SP (ΓSC , P ).
In the next example, we assume that students’ preferences are college-lexicographic
and colleges’ preferences over sets of students satisfy substitutability. We will see that
even with these strong restrictions on preferences, the core correspondence cannot be
implemented by the ΓSC mechanism.
Example 3 Consider two colleges C = {c1, c2} and four students S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}
with the following preference profile P :
P (c1) : {s1, s2, s4}, {s1, s2}, {s1, s4}, {s2, s4}, {s1}, {s2}, {s3}, {s4}
P (c2) : {s2, s3}, {s2, s4}, {s3}, {s4}, {s3}, {s2}, {s1}, {s4}
Ps1 : c1
Ps2 : c2, c1
Ps3 : c2 and argmaxP (s3) = (c2, {s3})
Ps4 : c2, c1.
This notation means that (c2, {s3})P (s3)(c2, S ′) for all S ′ ∈ 2S\{s3}, (c2, S ′′)P (s3)(c1, S ′′′),
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and (c2, S
′′)P (s3)(∅, ∅) for all S ′′, S ′′′ ∈ 2S.
Consider the following strategy profile:
m(c1) = {s1, s2, s4},m(c2) = {s3}
m(s1) = m(s2) = m(s4) = (c1, {s1, s2, s4}), and m(s3) = (c2, {s3}).
It is easy to check that,
µ =
c1 c2
s1s2s4 s3
∈ SP (ΓSC , P ).
However, 〈{c2}, {s2, s4}, µ′(c2) = {s2, s4}〉 blocks µ. Therefore, µ 6∈ C(P ). This
implies that a symmetrical result for Theorem 5 cannot be obtained by exchanging
the role of students and colleges.
3.6 Final Remarks
This chapter presents sequential mechanisms to implement the core correspondence
of college admissions problems when colleagues matter. Without any restrictions on
the preferences, we propose a multi-stage mechanism that implements the core. This
implies that there is no SPNE if the core is empty for this multi-stage mechanism.
Under strong restrictions, we show that the extension of the “colleges propose and
students choose” mechanism can be used as a noncooperative game to reach the
core. Moreover, a symmetric version of the mechanism where colleges and students
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change their roles cannot implement the core with or without the restrictions on the
preferences. This shows that we should take into consideration whether students care
about their classmates or not when designing institutions for the real-life matching
problem.
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Chapter 4
A Theory of Stability in
Assignment Games
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4.1 Introduction
An assignment game is a two-sided matching market with monetary transfers. In
this market, there are two exogenously specified disjoint sets of agents, say firms and
workers. The agents engage in bilateral transactions (if worker i works for firm j
then firm j employs worker i) and make monetary transfers. Each firm can employ
no more than one worker and each worker can not work for more than one firm.
A natural solution concept for such markets is the core. The core outcomes specify
which partnership we can expect to observe and how the agents will divide their gains.
In this chapter, we provide an alternative way to characterize the core of assignment
games. We also construct the first algorithm to reach the all core outcomes for such
markets.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) show that every assignment game has non-empty core
and core payoffs have a nice structure. It is a non-empty complete lattice and there
is a polarization of interests in the core. This means that there is a stable outcome
which is the most preferred by every agent on one side of the market and at the
same time it is the least preferred by every agent on the other side of the market.
Geometrically, the core is a closed, convex polyhedron whose dimension is equal to
at most the minimum of the number of members in one group or in the other.
We construct a map T on a set of feasible payoffs such that the set of fixed points
of T is the core. Then we present a way to reach the core outcomes from fixed points
of the map. By recognizing that the mapping is monotone increasing, the lattice
property of the set of stable payoffs, as well as its non-emptiness, is proved as an
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immediate implication of Tarski’s fixed point theorem. Furthermore, we show that
there is a polarization of interests in the core by using our formulation.
Our characterization is useful because:
1) It allows us to construct an algorithm to find all core outcomes by iterating T .
2) It provides a very simple proof for the lattice structure of the core and the polar-
ization of interests in the core.
This type of fixed point argument has been used in assignment problems with
side payments before, but they only characterized certain points in the interior of
the core (a subset of the core—symmetrically bargained allocations) as stationary
points of a rebargaining process between players, see Rochford (1984). By observing
a certain monotonicity in the rebargaining process, Roth and Sotomayor (1988) show
that these interior points have a lattice property. Moreover, fixed point methods
have been used in assignment problems without side transfers (NTU games), see for
example Adachi (2000), Echenique and Oviedo (2004), or Echenique and Yenmez
(2007) for applications of a fixed point approach for different environments.
The organization of the rest of the chapter is as follows: In the next section, we give
a brief introduction to the Shapley and Shubik assignment game and provide some
of the well-known results using linear programming formulation. In Section 4.3, we
provide some preliminary definitions and state Tarski’s fixed point theorem. Section
4.4 formalizes our fixed point approach to the core and shows that our formulation
fully characterizes the set of stable outcomes which coincides with the core in this
setup. In Section 4.5, we study the lattice structure of stable payoffs. We show
72
that the stable payoffs form a non-empty complete lattice using our formulation. In
Section 4.6, we introduce the algorithm. The discussion and future research agenda
follows in Section 4.7.
4.2 Assignment Games with Money
This section gives a brief description of the assignment games and provides some well-
known results via linear programming proofs. We refer the reader to Shapley and
Shubik (1972) or Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for more discussion and justification of
the setup.
The game in coalitional function form with side payments is defined by three-tuple
Γ = 〈F,W, α〉 where
1. F = {f1, ..., fm} is a set of firms,
2. W = {w1, ..., wn} is a set of workers,
3. α is a m× n matrix of nonnegative numbers {αfw ∈ R+ : (f, w) ∈ F ×W} where
αfw is the value of pairwise partnership. Note that αkk = 0 for all k ∈ F ∪W .
An assignment µ : F ∪W → F ∪W is a one-to-one mapping of order two (that
is µ2(k) = k) such that if µ(f) 6= f then µ(f) ∈ W and if µ(w) 6= w then µ(w) ∈ F .
Let M be the set of all assignments. An assignment µ can also be represented as a
vector x ∈ {0, 1}F×W , such that xfw = 1 if µ(f) = w and xfw = 0, otherwise. Hence,∑
w∈W xfw ≤ 1 for all f ∈ F and
∑
f∈F xfw ≤ 1 for all w ∈ W .
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An assignment x is optimal if for all x′ ∈M,
∑
(f,w)∈F×W
αfwxfw ≥
∑
(f,w)∈F×W
αfwx
′
fw.
Let X be the set of optimal assignments. The optimal assignment is usually unique.
If there is more than one optimal assignment, a slight perturbation of the values of
the pairwise partnerships will result in a unique optimal assignment.
Any agent is free to remain single and receive zero, and the worth of an arbi-
trary coalition is equal to the sums of the pairwise coalitions it can form with pairs
consisting of one agent from F and one from W . That is for all coalitions S,
V (S) =

0 if |S| = 0 or 1
0 if S ⊆ F or S ⊆ W
maxµ:F∩S→W∩S
∑
f∈F∩S αfµ(f) if |F ∩ S| ≤ |W ∩ S|
maxµ′:W∩S→F∩S
∑
w∈W∩S αµ(w)w if |F ∩ S| ≥ |W ∩ S|.
Definition 2 The pair of vectors (u, v), with u ∈ Rm and v ∈ Rn, is called a feasible
payoff for Γ = 〈F,W, α〉 if there is an assignment x such that
∑
f∈F
uf +
∑
w∈W
vw =
∑
(f,w)∈F×W
αfwxfw.
In this case we say (u, v) and x are compatible with each other, and we call
((u, v);x) a feasible outcome.
Definition 3 A feasible outcome ((u, v);x) is stable (or the payoff (u, v) with an
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assignment x is stable) if
(i) uf ≥ 0, vw ≥ 0 (individual rationality)
(ii) uf + vw ≥ αfw for all (f, w) ∈ F ×W.
Note that condition (ii) only eliminates deviations by pair of agents since the set
of pairwise stable outcomes coincides with the set of group stable outcomes in this
framework. Let S(Γ) be the set of stable payoffs.
Consider just the assignment problem for the coalition of all players:
(AP)
max z =
∑
(f,w)∈F×W
αfwxfw
s.t.
∑
w∈W
xfw ≤ 1 ∀ f ∈ F,
∑
f∈F
xfw ≤ 1 ∀ w ∈ W,
xfw ≥ 0 ∀ (f, w) ∈ F ×W.
This optimization problem is associated with dual linear program having the form:
(DAP)
min d =
∑
f∈F
uf +
∑
w∈W
vw
s.t. uf + vw ≥ αfw ∀ (f, w) ∈ F ×W,
uf , vw ≥ 0.
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Therefore, (DAP) formulates the problem of finding payoff vectors in the core of the
assignment game. The existence of optimal solutions of (AP) and duality theorem
show that the set of stable payoff vectors is non-empty. Moreover, in the game the
set of stable outcomes and the core are the same.
Theorem 6 (Shapley and Shubik 1972) The core of an assignment game (C(Γ)
= S(Γ)×X ) is non-empty and is precisely equal to the set of solutions of the (DAP).
4.3 Preliminary Definitions
Tarski’s fixed point theorem is crucial in our formulation. Before stating the theorem,
the following definitions will be useful. A partial order is a binary relation which
is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric. A set X endowed with a partial order
≤ is denoted 〈X,≤〉. 〈X,≤〉 is a complete lattice if, for all non-empty B ⊆ X,
the greatest lower bound
∧
X B and the least upper bound
∨
X B exist in X. Let
〈X,≤X〉 be a (complete) lattice and 〈Y,≤Y 〉 be a partially ordered set. A function
F : X → Y is monotone increasing if x ≤X y implies F (x) ≤Y F (y). Let
E(F ) = {x ∈ X : x = F (x)} be the set of fixed points of F . See Topkis (1998) for
more on these concepts.
Theorem 7 Let 〈X,〉, be a complete lattice. If F : X → X is monotone increasing,
then 〈E(F ),〉, is a non-empty complete lattice.
Proof. See Tarski (1955) or Echenique (2005) for a short and constructive proof.
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4.4 The Core as a Set of Fixed Points
In this section, we present a formulation that allows us to fully characterize the core as
the set of fixed points of a certain function. We assume that |F | = |W | = n to simplify
the formulation.1 We shall also assume that for all f ∈ F uf ∈ {0, 1, ...,maxw∈W αfw}
and for all w ∈ W vw ∈ {0, 1, ...,maxf∈F αfw} to make the payoff space discrete.
These assumptions simplify the notation, but all results hold without these assump-
tions.
We can now proceed to define our formulation. Let Y be the set of possible payoffs
such that:
Y = {((uf )f∈F , (vw)w∈W ) | ∀f ∈ F, 0 ≤ uf ≤ max
w∈W
αfw ; ∀w ∈ W, 0 ≤ vw ≤ max
f∈F
αfw}.
Given (u, v), let
Uf1(u, v) = max
w∈W
(αf1w − vw),
Uf2(u, v) = max
w∈W 2=W\{argmaxw∈W (αf1w−vw)}
(αf2w − vw),
...
Ufn(u, v) = max
w∈Wn
(αfnw − vw),
Vw1(u, v) = max
f∈F
(αfw1 − uf ),
Vw2(u, v) = max
f∈F 2=F\{argmaxf∈F (αfw1−uf )}
(αfw2 − uf ),
1It is easy to extend the formulation to a more general model that allows for different number
of firms and workers. This can be done by adding null firm (or null worker) which represent being
unemployed for workers (not having any worker for firms).
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...
Vwn(u, v) = max
f∈Fn
(αfwn − uf ).
Note that argmaxw∈W ′(αfiw − vw) and argmaxf∈F ′(αfwj − uf ) may not be a
singleton. Hence, U(.) and V (.) may not be well defined. We use a tie breaking rule to
avoid the cases when these sets are not singleton. A tie breaking rule guarantees that
|argmaxw∈W ′(αfiw − vw)| = |argmaxf∈F ′(αfwj − uf )| = 1 for all (f, w) ∈ F ′ ×W ′ ⊆
F×W . We also want our mapping to be consistent in the sense that it is independent
of the sequence of agents in which the final payoffs are realized.
Let F ⊆ Y be the set of firms consistent payoffs, W ⊆ Y be the set of workers
consistent payoffs, B ⊆ Y be the set of firms and workers consistent payoffs, and
Z ⊆ Y be the set of inconsistent payoffs. (u, v) ∈ F if and only if either there exist
a firm-consistent tie breaking rule or for all f ∈ F |argmaxw∈W (αfw − vw)| = 1, such
that for all n ≥ 2, and all fn ∈ F ,
argmaxw∈W (αfnw − vw) ∈ W n = W n−1 \ {argmaxw∈Wn−1(αfn−1w − vw)}, (4.1)
where W 1 = W . This implies U(.) is independent of the order of firms. (u, v) ∈ W if
and only if either there exist a worker-consistent tie breaking rule or for all w ∈ W
|argmaxf∈F (αfw − uf )| = 1, such that for all n ≥ 2, and all wn ∈ W ,
argmaxf∈F (αfwn − uf ) ∈ F n = F n−1 \ {argmaxf∈Fn−1(αfwn−1 − uf )}, (4.2)
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where F 1 = F . This implies V (.) is independent of the order of workers. (u, v) ∈ B
if and only if (u, v) ∈ F and (u, v) ∈ W . (u, v) ∈ Z if and only if there does not exist
any type of consistent tie breaking rule or there is no need for a tie breaking rule,
such that neither (4.1) nor (4.2) does hold. Notice that Z = Y \ F ∪W , B ⊆ F , and
B ⊆ W .
Lemma 5 (u, v) ∈ B if and only if there exists a tie breaking rule such that w′ =
argmaxw∈W (αf ′w − vw) if and only if f ′ = argmaxf∈F (αfw′ − uf ).
Proof. It is enough to show that the tie breaking rule defined is consistent. Let
(u, v) ∈ Y and suppose that there exists a tie breaking rule such that
w′ = argmaxw∈W (αf ′w − vw)⇔ f ′ = argmaxf∈F (αfw′ − uf ).
This implies there is no f, f ′ ∈ F , and f 6= f ′ such that argmaxw∈W (αfw − vw) =
argmaxw∈W (αf ′w − vw). Moreover, there is no w,w′ ∈ W , and w 6= w′ such that
argmaxf∈F (αfw−uf ) = argmaxf∈F (αfw′−uf ). Then for all fn ∈ F , argmaxw∈W (αfnw−
vw) ∈ W n = W n−1\{argmaxw∈Wn−1(αfn−1w−vw)} and for all wn ∈ W , argmaxf∈F (αfwn−
uf ) ∈ F n = F n−1 \ {argmaxf∈Fn−1(αfwn−1 − uf )}. Therefore, the tie breaking rule is
consistent. Note that we do not need a tie breaking rule if all argmax{.} are singleton.
Remark 1 There may be more than one consistent tie breaking rule.
Now, define a map T : Y → Y such that if (u, v) ∈ F \ B then Tf (u, v) =
Uf (u, v) ∨ 0 = (maxw∈W (αfw − vw)) ∨ 0 for all f ∈ F and Tw(u, v) = V ′w(u, v) ∨ 0
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for all w ∈ W ; if (u, v) ∈ W \ B then Tf (u, v) = U ′f (u, v) ∨ 0 for all f ∈ F and
Tw(u, v) = Vw(u, v) ∨ 0 = (maxf∈F (αfw − uf )) ∨ 0 for all w ∈ W ; if (u, v) ∈ B then
Tf (u, v) = Uf (u, v) ∨ 0 = (maxw∈W (αfw − vw)) ∨ 0 for all f ∈ F and Tw(u, v) =
Vw(u, v) ∨ 0 = (maxf∈F (αfw − uf )) ∨ 0 for all w ∈ W ; if (u, v) ∈ Z then U(u, v) and
V (u, v) are not order independent and hence we use an arbitrary fixed tie breaking
rule in which if an agent is indifferent between two agents from other side of the
market, the agent prefers the one with a lower index. That is
U ′f1(u, v) = maxw∈W
(αf1w − vw),
U ′f2(u, v) = max
w∈W 2=W\{wi|i≤j ∀ wi,wj∈argmaxw∈W (αf1w−vw)}
(αf2w − vw),
...
U ′fn(u, v) = maxw∈Wn
(αfnw − vw),
V ′w1(u, v) = maxf∈F
(αfw1 − uf ),
V ′w2(u, v) = max
f∈F 2=F\{fi|i≤j ∀ fi,fj∈argmaxf∈F (αfw1−uf )}
(αfw2 − uf ),
...
V ′wn(u, v) = maxf∈Fn
(αfwn − uf ).
Let E(T ) = {(u, v) ∈ Y : (u, v) = T (u, v)} be the set of fixed points of T . We
suppose that E(T ) 6= ∅ for this section. In Section 4.5, we will prove that the set of
fixed points of T is non-empty.
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Lemma 6 If (u, v) ∈ E(T ) then (u, v) ∈ B.
Proof. Suppose (u, v) ∈ F \ B. This implies there exists a tie breaking rule which is
firm consistent but not worker consistent. Then there is wj ∈ W such that Twj(u, v) 6=
maxf∈F (αfwj − vf ). Moreover, there is fi, fk ∈ F such that fi = argmaxf∈F (αfwj −
uf ) 6∈ F j and fk = argmaxf∈F j(αfwj − uf ). This implies Twj(u, v) = αfkwj − ufk <
αfiwj − ufi = vwj . Therefore, (u, v) 6∈ E(T ). Now, suppose (u, v) ∈ W \ B. By
reversing the roles of workers with firms in the above argument, we get (u, v) 6∈ E(T ).
The argument for (u, v) ∈ Z implies (u, v) 6∈ E(T ) is also identical to the first step.
As a result, E(T ) ⊆ Y \ {{F ∪W ∪ Z} \ B} = B.
Remark 2 The other direction of the above result is not true. The following example
shows that there is (u, v) ∈ B but (u, v) 6∈ E(T ).
Remark 3 It is also easy to see that S(Γ) ⊆ B using Lemma 5 and the definition of
core payoffs.
The following example illustrates the structure of the mapping T .
Example 4 [Shapley-Shubik (1972)]. Let Γ = 〈{f1, f2, f3}, {w1, w2, w3}, α〉 be an
assignment game where α is
w1 w2 w3
f1 5 8 2
f2 7 9 6
f3 2 3 0
.
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In this example (0, 0, 0, 7, 9, 6) ∈ F\B, (8, 9, 3, 0, 0, 0) ∈ W\B, (3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1) ∈ B,
and (0, 0, 0, 7, 9, 1) ∈ Z. Then, T (0, 0, 0, 7, 9, 6) = (0, 0, 0, 7, 8, 0), T (8, 9, 3, 0, 0, 0) =
(8, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0), T (3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1) = (3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1), and T (0, 0, 0, 7, 9, 1) = (1, 0, 0, 7, 8, 0).
Moreover, (4, 5, 0, 2, 4, 0) ∈ B but (4, 5, 0, 2, 4, 0) 6∈ E(T ).
Two of our main results can now be stated. The first one (Proposition 5) shows
that the core (or stable) payoffs of the assignment game are equal to the set of fixed
points of the aforementioned mapping. Note that core outcomes are the Cartesian
product of the core payoffs and the set of optimal assignments. The second one
(Corollary 3) which directly follows from the first main result, states that the core
is equivalent to the Cartesian product of the set of fixed points of T and the set of
optimal assignments.
Proposition 5 E(T ) = S(Γ).
Proof. First we show that S(Γ) ⊆ E(T ). Let (u, v) ∈ S(Γ). This implies that
there is at least one optimal assignment x (or µ) such that
∑
f∈F uf +
∑
w∈W vw =∑
(f,w)∈F×W αfwxfw and for all (f, w) ∈ F×W , uf +vw = αfw if f and w are matched
and uf + vw ≥ αfw if f and w are not matched. Moreover, uf ≥ 0 for all f ∈ F and
vw ≥ 0 for all w ∈ W . Then for a given f ∈ F , uf ≥ αfj − vj for all j ∈ W and
µ(f) ∈ argmaxj∈W (αfj − vj). This implies
uf1 = αf1µ(f1) − vµ(f1) =
(
max
w∈W
(αf1w − vw)
)
∨ 0 = Uf1(u, v),
uf2 = αf2µ(f2) − vµ(f2) =
(
max
w∈W\{µ(f1)}
(αf2w − vw)
)
∨ 0 = Uf2(u, v),
82
...
ufn = αfnµ(fn) − vµ(fn) =
(
max
w∈W\{∪i≤(n−1)µ(fi)}
(αfnw − vw)
)
∨ 0 = Ufn(u, v).
This implies uf = (Uf ) ∨ 0 for all f ∈ F . Similar arguments also reveal that,
vw = (Vw)∨0 for all w ∈ W . Therefore, T (u, v) = (u, v), which implies (u, v) ∈ E(T ).
Next, we prove that E(T ) ⊆ S(Γ). Let (u, v) ∈ E(T ). This implies (u, v) ∈ B by
Lemma 6. We first need to show that there exists an assignment x such that it is
compatible with (u, v) implying ((u, v);x) is a feasible outcome. Let xfnw′ = 1 and
xfnw′′ = 0 for all w
′′ 6= w′, where w′ = argmaxw∈Wn(αfnw−vw) = argmaxw∈W (αfnw−
vw). By Lemma 5, fn = argmaxf∈F (αfw′−uf ). Then ufn ≥ αfnw′−vw′ ≥ αfnw′′−vw′′
for all w′′ 6= w′. Suppose that ufn > αfnw′ − vw′ . This is only possible if ufn = 0 and
vw′ > αfnw′ since ufn = maxw∈W (αfnw′ − vw′) ∨ 0. But then vw′ 6= maxf∈F (αfw′ −
uf )∨0 = αfnw′ , contradicting the assumption that (u, v) is a fixed point. This implies
ufn + vw′ = αfnw′ and ufn + vw′′ ≥ αfnw′′ for all w′′ 6= w′ when xfnw′ = 1. Define x
by repeating the process for all f ∈ F \ {fn}. Observe that x is an assignment by
construction. Then,
∑
f∈F uf +
∑
w∈W vw =
∑
(f,w)∈F×W αfwxfw, which implies that
((u, v);x) is a feasible outcome.
Now, we want to show that the payoff (u, v) with the assignment x is stable (i.e.,
x is an optimal assignment). First note that by the definition of fixed point uf ≥ 0
for all f ∈ F and vw ≥ 0 for all w ∈ W . Hence individual rationality is satisfied. We
already showed that if xfw = 1, uf +vw = αfw and for all f
′ 6= f , uf ′+vw ≥ αf ′w and
all w′ 6= w, uf + vw′ ≥ αfw′ . This implies that uf + vw ≥ αfw for all (f, w) ∈ F ×W .
Therefore (u, v) ∈ S(Γ).
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Corollary 3 E(T )×X = S(Γ)×X = C(Γ).
Proof. The result directly follows from Proposition 5 and the definition of core.
Remark 4 The set of optimal assignments is constructed using the following pro-
cess. Let (u, v) ∈ S(Γ) ⊆ B. Then there is a consistent tie breaking rule such
that w′ = argmaxw∈W (αf ′w − vw) if and only if f ′ = argmaxf∈F (αfw′ − uf ). Let
µ(w′) = f ′ and µ(f ′) = w′. Then, µ ∈ X . Note that there may be more than one
consistent tie breaking rule such that w′′ = argmaxw∈W (αf ′′w − vw) if and only if
f ′′ = argmaxf∈F (αfw′′ − uf ). We need to repeat the process for all such tie breaking
rules to reach the set of optimal assignments.
4.5 The Lattice Structure of Stable Payoffs
In this section we show that E(T ) is non-empty and forms a complete lattice. We
introduce a partial order on Y such that T is a monotone increasing map. Tarski’s
fixed point theorem then leads to a lattice structure on E(T ), and thus on S(Γ). First
we define the following binary relations on Y .
Definition 4 Let (u, v) ∈ Y.
(i) Define a binary relation ≥F by (u, v) ≥F (u′, v′)⇔ u ≥ u′.
(ii) Define a binary relation ≥W by (u, v) ≥W (u′, v′)⇔ v ≥ v′.
(iii) Define a partial ordering F by
(u, v) F (u′, v′)⇔ (u, v) ≥F (u′, v′) and (u′, v′) ≥W (u, v).
(iv) Define a partial ordering W by
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(u, v) W (u′, v′)⇔ (u, v) ≥W (u′, v′) and (u′, v′) ≥F (u, v).
The following lemma shows that T is a monotone increasing function under both
partial orders, F and W .
Lemma 7 For all (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ Y , (u, v) F (u′, v′) implies T (u, v) F T (u′, v′)
and (u, v) W (u′, v′) implies T (u, v) W T (u′, v′).
Proof. Let (u, v) F (u′, v′). We need to show that T (u, v) F T (u′, v′). Since
(u, v) F (u′, v′), uf ≥ u′f for all f ∈ F and v′w ≥ vw for all w ∈ W . Then for all
fi ∈ F ,
Tfi(u, v) = max
w∈W i
(αfiw − vw) ∨ 0
≥ max
w∈W i
(αfiw − v′w) ∨ 0 = Tfi(u′, v′).
Therefore, T (u, v) ≥F T (u′, v′). Similarly, T (u′, v′) ≥W T (u, v). Hence T (u, v) F
T (u′, v′). The proof of (u, v) W (u′, v′) implies T (u, v) W T (u′, v′) is similar.
The following results show that the set of core payoffs forms a complete lattice
under the partial orders F and W . We can prove them by applying Tarski’s fixed
point theorem.
Proposition 6 〈E(T ),F 〉 is a non-empty complete lattice.
Proof. We showed in Lemma 5 that T is monotone increasing with respect to F .
Moreover, 〈Y,≥F 〉 and 〈Y,≥W 〉 are complete lattices since Y is closed and bounded.
Then 〈Y,F 〉 is also a complete lattice since it is a product set endowed with a
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product order. Tarski’s fixed point theorem (Theorem 7) implies that E(T ) 6= ∅ and
〈E(T ),F 〉 is a complete lattice.
Proposition 7 〈E(T ),W 〉 is a non-empty complete lattice.
Proof. Omitted. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 6.
The above propositions (Proposition 6 and 7) also imply that there is a polar-
ization of interest in the core. That is, there is a F-optimal stable payoff (u¯, v) that
is simultaneously the best for all firms and the worst for all workers, and opposite
is true for W-optimal stable payoff (u, v). This type of polarization seems to be a
general property of two-sided matching markets.
The following lemma about the structure of the core is useful for the next section.
Lemma 8 Let (u, v) ∈ E(T ),(u′, v′) ∈ E(T ), and (u, v) F (u′, v′). If uf − u′f = t
then there is w ∈ W such that v′w − vw = t.
Proof. By Lemma 6, (u, v) ∈ B and (u′, v′) ∈ B. Then T is order independent.
Tf (u, v) = maxw∈W (αfw − vw) ∨ 0 = uf and Tf (u′, v′) = maxw∈W (αfw − v′w) ∨ 0 =
u′f = uf − t. This implies uf = maxw∈W (αfw − v′w + t). Therefore, there is w ∈ W
such that vw = v
′
w − t.
4.6 The Algorithm
The T-algorithm is very simple and uses our formulation. It starts at some (u, v) ∈ Y
and iterate T (u, v) until two iterations are identical. The algorithm stops when two
iterations are identical. We prove that when the algorithm stops, it must be at a
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stable payoff. Moreover, we show that all stable payoffs can be reached through the
algorithm.
T-algorithm:
1. Set (u0, v0) = (u, v). Set (u1, v1) = T (u0, v0) and k = 1.
2. While (uk, vk) 6= (uk−1, vk−1), do:
(a) set k = k + 1
(b) set (uk, vk) = T (uk−1, vk−1).
3. Set τ = (uk, vk). Stop.
Proposition 8 If the T-algorithm stops at τ ∈ Y , then τ is a stable payoff and there
is an optimal assignment x ∈ X such that (τ ;x) is in the core. If (uk, vk) is in the set
of stable payoffs, for some iteration k of the T-algorithm, then the algorithm stops at
τ = (uk, vk).
Proof. If the algorithm stops at τ ∈ Y , then (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1) = τ . Then,
τ = T (uk−1, vk−1) = T (τ), so τ ∈ E(T ). By Proposition 1, τ ∈ S(Γ). Moreover, by
Corollary 3, there is an optimal assignment x such that (τ ;x) ∈ C(Γ). To prove the
second part, observe that if (uk, vk) is a stable payoff, then (uk, vk) is a fixed point of
T by Proposition 5. Then the algorithm stops at τ = (uk, vk).
We now provide the second algorithm to find all core payoffs. Let
(u¯Y , vY ) = (max
w∈W
αf1w, ...,max
w∈W
αfnw, 0, ..., 0),
(uY , v¯Y ) = (0, ..., 0,max
f∈F
αfw1 , ...,max
f∈F
αfwn).
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Moreover, let enl be the l-th unit vector in Rn, i.e. enl = (0, ...1, 0, ..., 0) ∈ Rn, where
1 is the l-th element of enl .
Algorithm 2:
1. Set (u0, v0) = (u¯Y , vY ). Set (u
1, v1) = T (u0, v0) and k = 1.
2. While (uk, vk) 6= (uk−1, vk−1), do:
(a) set k = k + 1
(b) set (uk, vk) = T (uk−1, vk−1).
3. Set τ = (uk, vk).
4. Let Eˆ = τ . The possible states of the algorithm is Y . Start at state Ω0 where
Ω0 = {(u¯Y ∧ uk + enl , 0 ∨ vk − enm), (0 ∨ uk − enl , v¯Y ∧ vk + enm)} ⊂ Y
for all 1 ≤ l,m ≤ n. Let the state of the algorithm be Ω. While Ω′ 6= ∅ do the
following subroutine to get a new state Ω′. Then set Ω = Ω′.
SUBROUTINE: Let Ω′ = ∅. For each (u, v) ∈ Ω, run T (u, v). If T (u, v) = (u, v)
add (u, v) to Eˆ and add {(u¯Y ∧ u+ enl , 0 ∨ v − enm), (0 ∨ u− enl , v¯Y ∨ v + enm)} \ Eˆ for
all 1 ≤ l,m ≤ n to Ω′.
Theorem 8 The set Eˆ produced by Algorithm 2 coincides with the core payoffs S(Γ)
of the assignment games.
Proof. First I prove that the algorithm reaches a fixed point after a finite k number
of iterations. Then, we know that τ = (uk, vk) ∈ S(Γ) by Proposition 8. Then I show
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that Eˆ ⊆ S(Γ), and then S(Γ) ⊆ Eˆ .
We want to show that the first part of Algorithm 2, T-algorithm, reaches a fixed
point. That is for some finite k, τ = (uk, vk) = (uk−1, vk−1). Assume this does not hold
for any k. Then, {(uk, vk)} is an infinite sequence of distinct payoffs in Y . However,
there exists a finite number of payoffs that is for all f ∈ F uf ∈ {0, 1, ...,maxw∈W αfw}
and for all w ∈ W vw ∈ {0, 1, ...,maxf∈F αfw}, contradicting to the initial assumption.
This implies there is k <∞ such that T-algorithm reaches a fixed point.
Now we show that the rest of Algorithm 2 stops after a finite number of steps. Let
M ⊆ Y be the collection of states visited by the algorithm. Let d1(Ω), where Ω ⊆M ,
be the minimum of the Euclidean distance between payoffs in Ω and (u¯Y , vY ) and
d2(Ω) be the minimum of the Euclidean distance between payoffs in Ω and (uY , v¯Y ).
If Ω = ∅, let d1(Ω) = d2(Ω) = 0. We consider d1(Ω) and d2(Ω) because if the state is
{(u¯Y , vY ), (uY , v¯Y )}, {(u¯Y , vY )}, or {(uY , v¯Y )} the next state is ∅ by the definition of
the subroutine. Let Ω′ and Ω′′ be successive states in the algorithm. It is clear from
the definition that d1(Ω′) > d1(Ω′′) and d2(Ω′) > d2(Ω′′). Since M is a finite set, d1(.)
and d2(.) takes only a finite number of values. Thus after a finite number of steps the
algorithm stops, i.e., Ω = ∅.
Eˆ ⊆ S(Γ). Let (u, v) ∈ Eˆ . This implies (u, v) = T (u, v) by the definition of
the algorithm and hence (u, v) ∈ E(T ). By Proposition 5, E(T ) = S(Γ). Therefore
(u, v) ∈ S(Γ) which proves Eˆ ⊆ S(Γ).
S(Γ) ⊆ Eˆ . Let (u, v) ∈ S(Γ) = E(T ). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
(u, v) 6∈ Eˆ . This implies τ = (uk, vk) 6= (u, v) and (u, v) 6∈ M so that the algorithm’s
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states does not contain (u, v). Then either τ F (u, v) or τ F (u, v). Suppose,
without loss of generality, τ F (u, v) and maxf∈F (ukf − uf ) = t. By Lemma 8, there
is w ∈ W such that vw − vkw = t. Now we show that {(u¯Y ∧ u+ enf , 0 ∨ v − eng )} 6∈M
for all 1 ≤ f, g ≤ n. Suppose this is not the case. Then there is a state Ωc of the
algorithm and a, b ∈ [1, n] such that (u¯Y ∧ u+ ena , 0∨ v− enb ) ∈ Ωc ⊆M . This is only
possible if (u, v) is in the previous state Ωc−1 ⊆M by the definition of the subroutine;
a contradiction since we assumed that (u, v) 6∈M . Using the same argument, we can
also conclude that for all 1 ≤ h, k ≤ n {(u¯Y ∧ u + enf + enh, 0 ∨ v − eng − enk)} 6∈ M .
Repeating the same argument t − 1 times implies (u¯Y ∧ uk − enl , 0 ∨ vk + eng ) 6∈ M ,
which is a contradiction since we have shown that there is τ = (uk, vk) ∈ Eˆ and
(u¯Y ∧ uk − enl , 0 ∨ vk + eng ) ∈ Ω0 ⊆M . This implies (u, v) ∈M and hence (u, v) ∈ Eˆ .
The case where τ F (u, v) is also similar.
Now we use Example 4 to show the details of the algorithm. Algorithm 2 starts at
(u0, v0) = (8, 9, 3, 0, 0, 0) and does T (8, 9, 3, 0, 0, 0) = (8, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0), T (8, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0) =
(8, 7, 0, 2, 2, 0), T (8, 7, 0, 2, 2, 0) = (6, 6, 0, 2, 2, 0), T (6, 6, 0, 2, 2, 0) = (5, 6, 0, 2, 3, 0),
T (5, 6, 0, 2, 3, 0) = (5, 6, 0, 2, 3, 0). This implies τ = (5, 6, 0, 2, 3, 0). Now,
Ω0 = {(6, 6, 0, 1, 3, 0), (6, 6, 0, 2, 2, 0), (6, 6, 0, 2, 3, 0), (5, 7, 0, 1, 3, 0), (5, 7, 0, 2, 2, 0),
(5, 7, 0, 2, 3, 0), (5, 6, 1, 1, 3, 0), (5, 6, 1, 2, 2, 0), (5, 6, 1, 2, 3, 0), (4, 6, 0, 3, 3, 0),
(4, 6, 0, 2, 4, 0), (4, 6, 0, 2, 3, 1), (5, 5, 0, 3, 3, 0), (5, 5, 0, 2, 4, 0), (5, 5, 0, 2, 3, 1),
(5, 6, 0, 3, 3, 0), (5, 6, 0, 2, 4, 0), (5, 6, 0, 2, 3, 1)}.
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Note that for all (u, v) ∈ {(5, 6, 1, 1, 3, 0), (4, 6, 0, 2, 4, 0)} ⊂ Ω0, T (u, v) = (u, v).
Then add {(5, 6, 1, 1, 3, 0), (4, 6, 0, 2, 4, 0)} to Eˆ . The new state is
Ω = {(5, 6, 1, 1, 3, 0) + (e3l ,−e3m), (5, 6, 1, 1, 3, 0) + (−e3l ,+e3m),
(4, 6, 0, 2, 4, 0) + (e3l ,−e3m), (4, 6, 0, 2, 4, 0) + (−e3l , e3m)} \ {(5, 6, 0, 2, 3, 0)}.
For all (u, v) ∈ {(4, 6, 1, 1, 4, 0), (4, 5, 0, 2, 4, 1), (3, 6, 0, 2, 5, 0)} ⊂ Ω, T (u, v) = (u, v).
Then add {(4, 6, 1, 1, 4, 0), (4, 5, 0, 2, 4, 1), (3, 6, 0, 2, 5, 0)} to Eˆ . The new state is
Ω′ = {(4, 6, 1, 1, 4, 0) + (e3l ,−e3m), (4, 6, 1, 1, 4, 0) + (−e3l ,+e3m), (4, 5, 0, 2, 4, 1) + (e3l ,−e3m),
(4, 5, 0, 2, 4, 1) + (−e3l ,+e3m), (3, 6, 0, 2, 5, 0) + (e3l ,−e3m), (3, 6, 0, 2, 5, 0) + (−e3l ,+e3m)} \ Eˆ .
It is only the case that for (3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1) ∈ Ω′, T (3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1) = (3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1).
Then add (3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1) to Eˆ . The new state is
Ω′′ = {(3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1) + (e3l ,−e3m), (3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1) + (−e3l ,+e3m)} \ Eˆ .
Note that there is not any (u, v) ∈ Ω′′ such that T (u, v) = (u, v). Then the new state
is ∅. This implies the algorithm stops and the core of the assignment game is
Eˆ = {(5, 6, 0, 2, 3, 0), (5, 6, 1, 1, 3, 0), (4, 6, 0, 2, 4, 0), (4, 6, 1, 1, 4, 0), (4, 5, 0, 2, 4, 1),
(3, 6, 0, 2, 5, 0), (3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1)}.
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4.7 Formulation with Core Outcomes Is Not Pos-
sible
It would be nice to find a construction such that fixed points will directly provide
the core outcomes. However unlike assignment literature without money, it is not
possible to work with core outcomes in this setup. In the rest of this section, we
define a reasonable construction which can work with outcomes. Then we provide
examples to show that this type of formulation is not possible.
Let pi be a pre-assignment if pi : F ∪W → F ∪W such that pi(f) ∈ W ∪{f} for
all f ∈ F , and pi(w) ∈ F ∪ {w} for all w ∈ W . Let Π be the set of all pre-assignment
vectors. Define a map T ′ : Y × Π→ Y × Π such that
T ′f ((u, v); pi(f)) = ((maxUf (u, v)) ∨ 0;w) where w ∈ argmax (αfw − vw) ∀f ∈ F,
and
T ′w((u, v); pi(w)) = ((maxVw(u, v); f)) ∨ 0 where f ∈ argmax (αfw − uf ) ∀w ∈ W.
Then we could show that the fixed points of T ′ are equivalent to the core. However,
this type of formulation is not possible in this framework since there might be more
than one optimal assignment and different (pre)assignments might correspond to
same payoffs. Then, fixed point of T ′ may fail to induce an assignment. Moreover,
proving the existence of a fixed point is problematic. On the other hand, by using
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our formulation core payoffs can always be found, and core outcomes will be equal to
the Cartesian product of the fixed points and the set of optimal assignments which
is constructed.
Example 5 [Shapley-Shubik (1972)] Let Γ = 〈{f1, f2, f3}, {w1, w2, w3}, α〉 be an as-
signment game where α is
w1 w2 w3
f1 0 2 0
f2 2 0 2
f3 0 2 0
.
There are four optimal assignments given by
X = {(0, 1, 0; 1, 0, 0; 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0; 0, 0, 1; 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1; 1, 0, 0; 0, 1, 0),
(1, 0, 0; 0, 0, 1; 0, 1, 0)}
with value
∑
(f,w)∈F×W αfwxfw = 4. The core of the game is given by
C(Γ) = (0, 2, 0, 0, 2, 0)×X .
Moreover, ((0, 2, 0, 0, 2, 0);pi) where pi(f1) = w1, pi(f2) = w3, pi(f3) = w2, pi(w1) =
f3, pi(w2) = f1, pi(w3) = f3 is a fixed point of T
′ with appropriate tie breaking rule
but pi is not an assignment. Hence ((0, 2, 0, 0, 2, 0); pi) 6∈ C(Γ).
The following example shows that a construction like T ′ will not work even though
there is a unique optimal assignment.
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Example 6 (The same as Example 4). Let Γ′ = 〈{f1, f2, f3}, {w1, w2, w3}, α′〉 be an
assignment game where α′ is
w1 w2 w3
f1 5 8 2
f2 7 9 6
f3 2 3 0
.
There is one optimal assignment given by
X = {(0, 1, 0; 0, 0, 1; 1, 0, 0)}
with value
∑
(f,w)∈F×W αfwxfw = 16. It is easy to see that (3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1) ∈ S(Γ′).
Moreover, ((3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1);pi) where pi(f1) = w1, pi(f2) = w3, pi(f3) = w2, pi(w1) =
f3, pi(w2) = f1, pi(w3) = f2 is a fixed point of T
′ with appropriate tie breaking rule
but pi is not an assignment. Hence ((3, 5, 0, 2, 5, 1); pi) 6∈ C(Γ′).
Note that we only work on the lattice structure of core payoffs since different
optimal assignments may correspond to same payoffs (See Example 5). Hence, it
is not possible to construct a binary relation which is antisymmetric on E(T ) × X
( F or W is not a partial order on the set of core outcomes.)
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4.8 Final Remarks
The paper presents an alternative way to formulate the core of assignment games as
the fixed points of a certain mapping, via a powerful algebraic fixed point theorem of
Tarski.
In our formulation, we work with payoffs and construct optimal assignments
rather than directly working with outcomes. The main reason for that is differ-
ent (pre)assignments might lead to a same payoff structure and the mapping defined
on feasible outcomes may fail to induce an assignment. Moreover, defining a partial
order on the Cartesian product of the payoffs and (pre)assignments is a problem.
Such a formulation (if it is not impossible) which works also with outcomes, seems to
be an important follow-up to our work.
The extension of this new formulation to many-to-one and many-to-many assign-
ment games will be a subject of our future work. Sotomayor (1999) showed that the
results in one-to-one assignment game can be extended to these more complex assign-
ment models. Therefore, it might be possible to extend the techniques developed in
this paper to any such markets.
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